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PRISONS OF THE MIND: SOCIAL VALUE
AND ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO
MENTAL ILLNESS
AMANDA C. PUSTILNIK*
Can constructs of social meaning lead to actual criminal confinement?'
Can the intangible value ascribed to the maintenance of certain social norms
lead to radically inefficient choices about resource allocation? The
disproportionate criminal confinement of people with severe mental
illnesses2 relative to non-mentally ill individuals, adjusting for differences
Associate, Covington & Burling; Law clerk, Judge Josd A. Cabranes; J.D. Yale
University. I am grateful to Dan M. Kahan, Reva B. Siegel, and Kate Stith of the Yale Law
School, Dan Hunter of the University of Pennsylvania, and Allan Brandt of Harvard
University, Chair, Department of the History of Science, for their insightful comments and
guidance, and for research support provided by the Yale Law School.
I For a working definition of "social meaning," see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago
School, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 661, 681 (1998) [hereinafter Lessig, The New Chicago School]
(defining "social meaning" as "what that [an] act, omission, or status means to a community
of interpreters").
2 The general term "mental illness" may encompass diverse phenomena that are generic,
biochemical, psychological, or even socially constructed. The conditions considered to be
"mental illness" may be historically and geographically contingent, and may be contested
even within one place and time. This Article focuses on a specific segment of mental illness,
severe mental illness such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major psychoses, as those
conditions are defined by the U.S. Department of Health, the American Psychiatric
Association, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, among other sources relied upon in this
Article. (For further definition of these conditions, and sources relied upon, see infra note
23.) Criminal conduct alone and behavior generally considered antisocial not accompanied
by a diagnosable psychiatric disorder are not encompassed within the definition of "severe
mental illness." Holding aside controversies concerning the etiology of severe mental
illness, such as schizophrenia and major psychoses, there is little serious dispute about the
reality of the impact of these conditions on the daily life functioning of people suffering
from them. Moreover, institutions tasked with caring for, or confining, people with these
conditions acknowledge that this population requires different treatment and poses different
challenges than a population without such conditions. Relying on the acceptance by public
institutions and the medical community of the necessity of some treatment for people with
severe mental illness, this Article examines how and where people with these illnesses are
treated, and at what costs.
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in lawbreaking conduct between the two groups, suggests that social
meanings related to mental illness can create legal and physical walls
around this disfavored group. Responding to problems of mental illness
principally through the criminal system imposes billions of dollars in costs
annually on the public, 3 above any offsetting benefit in public safety and
deterrence, and imposes terrible human costs on people who suffer from
these illnesses.
4
Yet, the criminal confinement regime may create intangible social
value by reinforcing norms related to personal responsibility, based on the
current and historical social meaning of mental illness. And social
meaning, according to legal scholars working in expressive or New Chicago
School law and economics, is an essential term in the economic analysis of
law.5 Reform efforts aimed at replacing the current punitive paradigm with
a medical or therapeutic model founder because they fail to account for the
social meanings that maintain the punitive paradigm and for the social value
it creates. Understanding the social meanings of mental illness and how
they intersect with the norm-enforcing role of the criminal law can lead to
normatively literate reform proposals, liberating tremendous economic and
human value.
It is beyond cavil that the criminal justice system functions as the
United States' default asylum system. For every one person treated for a
psychiatric illness in a hospital, about five people with such conditions are
treated, or confined without treatment, in penal facilities. Many people
3 See infra Part ll.B. 1 (estimating that the annual incarceration costs alone of nonviolent
and nonoffending adults and children are approximately $5.95 billion). This estimate does
not include other direct costs of involvement in the criminal justice system.
4 These costs have been noted by a plethora of federal and state task forces and
committees. See COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INCARCERATION OF YOUTH WHO ARE WAITING FOR COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF
YOUTH]; OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2003 (2004) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2003 REPORT] (also reporting extensively on mentally ill individuals in
prisons and jails); Exec. Order No. 13263, 3 C.F.R. 233 (2003), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg.
22,337 (April 29, 2002) (Order of President George W. Bush, establishing the President's
New Freedom Commission on Mental Health); COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT (2002); OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND
TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH:
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999). The findings of each of the works cited here
are discussed infra.
5 Although this term was coined by Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at
661, work in this area has been advanced by many scholars.
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with mental illnesses confined in prisons and jails have committed no
offense at all or merely a public order infraction: statistics show that
between 30 and 40 percent of mentally ill individuals in the jails of certain
states had no criminal charges pending against them, while jails report
frequently holding people with mental illnesses simply because there is no
other place to put them. Criminal confinement principally or exclusively
because of mental illness affects U.S. children as well.
The confinement of adults and children with mental illnesses in penal
facilities comes at an extraordinarily high cost to the U.S. economy. The
direct costs include the costs of involvement in the criminal justice system
from arrest through incarceration and release, while the indirect costs
include lost productivity resulting from untreated or undertreated mental
illness and from incarceration, as well as the lost productivity of the family
members or other intimates who provide unpaid care for a person with a
mental illness. Economists and legal scholars have not attempted to
calculate the total direct and indirect cost to the economy of a public order
response to mental illness. This Article attempts to estimate from existing
data sources the direct cost of the public order response. It also separates
out the costs attributable to the use of the criminal system for nonviolent
and nonoffending people with mental illnesses from those attributable to
violent offenders.
Yet, to say something is costly says nothing about its worth. Even a
massive expenditure can be valuable if the benefits are similarly great. In
classical economic terms, incarceration expenditures can be considered net
positive, and rational, if the value they produce in the form of deterrence
and public safety exceeds the costs. Yet, a substantial portion of the costs
incurred as a result of the public order response to people with mental
illnesses produces no deterrence or public safety benefits. General
deterrence (the notion that potential lawbreakers are dissuaded from their
intended crime when they see others have been locked up for the same
thing) and specific deterrence (the prevention of a particular person
committing his or her intended crime) certainly cannot be promoted by
incarcerating people who have not committed a crime. Similarly, public
safety is not advanced by confining people who are nonoffending or whose
offenses of conviction are nonviolent. Even as to violent mentally ill
lawbreakers, public safety may be better served by detention in secure
hospitals, as many prison systems transfer their violent mentally ill inmates
to hospitals in any event.6 The lack of value in the criminal response to
mental illness is further thrown into relief by various states' pilot programs
6 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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offering less expensive, more effective non-criminal alternatives. Yet, these
programs are perpetually starved of funding.
This presents a stark conundrum: why do governmental units choose to
spend billions of dollars a year to concentrate people with serious illnesses
in a system designed to punish intentional lawbreaking, when doing so
matches neither the putative purposes of that system nor most effectively
addresses the issues posed by that population? This set of contradictions is
all the more puzzling for the extent to which it is generally not remarked
upon or challenged. For if there is serious discussion in the academy at all
about the truly vast interrelationship of mental illness and the criminal
justice system, it centers on the interesting but empirically trivial insanity
defense,7 which is supposed to exclude people with mental illnesses from
criminal punishment under certain circumstances, not on the paradoxes of
why the criminal system is in fact the system of choice for dealing with
people with these illnesses.8
This Article suggests that the tremendous economic and human costs
of the public order response to mental illness not only are unquestioned by
scholars but are actively embraced lawmakers and voters because of the
prevailing social meaning of mental illness. The New Chicago School of
law and economics posits that social meaning (which is what an "act,
omission, or status means to a community of interpreters"9) creates social
value, and that social value is an essential term in the economic analysis of
law. This Article contends that the social meanings of mental illness at play
in U.S. culture are the "moral/punitive" model, which is dominant, and the
"medical/therapeutic," which is subordinate.
7 "Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's lead, forests of paper have been expended on
[debating the insanity defense]" over the last century. Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the
Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 516 (1968). A small sample of key works on
the insanity defense includes HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY
(1972); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"
Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
8 The extent of the involvement of people with mental illnesses in the criminal justice
system has been written on by few legal academics, but most extensively by Michael Perlin;
however, Perlin's focus remains on the insanity defense. See, e.g., Michael Perlin, "The
Borderline Which Separated You From Me ": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit,
the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375 (1997); Michael
Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense " and Heuristic
Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990). A literature review reveals neither any institutional
analysis of the public order response to problems of mental health nor any law and
economics analysis of this institutional preference.
9 Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at 681.
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Under the moral/punitive model, mental illness is conceived of as a
failure of responsibility, not as a set of medical conditions that require and
respond to treatment. Social value is created through a criminal justice
response to mental illness because, under current ways of thinking about
mental illness, the punishment of people with mental illnesses is believed to
reinforce the core norm of individual responsibility. Punishment of people
with mental illnesses dovetails with our beliefs about the appropriate role of
the criminal system in punishing culpable failures of responsibility and of
prison as the place for people who violate not only the law but core social
norms.
Support for this claim is abundant: the notion that mental illness
should not be treated but policed as a failure of responsibility, and that this
response reinforces the norm of individual responsibility, finds expression
in legal scholarship, among mock and actual juries, in legislation and in the
statements of lawmakers. The unacceptability of hospital-based
confinement as a potential "alternative sanction" also attests to the primacy
of the moral/punitive model over the medical/therapeutic. Further, the
contrast between the criminal disposition of people with mental illnesses
and the excuse of "temporary insanity" highlights the role that the specific
social meaning of mental illness plays in relation to the norm of individual
responsibility. This defense applies only to non-mentally ill actors who
break the law as a result of certain "provocative" circumstances (originally,
catching a spouse in adultery, although the circumstances deemed
sufficiently provocative are historically and culturally contingent). This
shows that the law excuses lapses that are construed as virtuous but not
those that are seen as culpable, or simply alien.
Like mental illness, the institution of prison also has a particular social
meaning. An extensive body of scholarship on the history of the prison
suggests that prison not only confines but signifies society's disgust toward
those who transgress against valued norms, including against the norm of
individual responsibility. This meaning of the prison in addition to
confinement (for secure hospitals can also confine) points to utility created
by the incarceration even of nonviolent and nonoffending people with
mental illnesses-so long as mental illness is conceived of under a
moral/punitive paradigm. But if mental illness were conceived of under a
medical/therapeutic model, the confluence between the meanings of mental
illness and of prison would disappear. This would liberate tremendous
economic and human value and require the location of people with mental
illnesses in a different, treatment-based system.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces New Chicago
School scholarship and the rise of the importance of social meaning in the
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economic analysis of law. It then posits the existence of some positive
social value created by the public order response to mental illness that
accounts for the resilience of that regime.
Part II presents the use of corrections facilities as confinement centers
for people with mental illnesses, the tremendous associated costs, and the
absence of offsetting gains in deterrence or public safety. Part II.A presents
statistics from the state and federal prison systems, including jails and
juvenile corrections facilities, to show that the criminal justice system in
fact serves as the default system for hundreds of thousands of adults and
children with mental illnesses. Part II.B estimates the costs associated with
using the criminal system specifically to confine nonviolent and
nonoffending people with mental illnesses and evaluates the extent to which
there may be offsetting deterrence or public safety gains. It concludes that,
in classical economic terms, the use of the criminal system is irrational
because the massive costs to confine nonviolent and nonoffending adults
and children are not offset by the traditional benefits; further, it presents
some evidence that public health alternatives are cost-effective but
disfavored.
Part III supports the claim that the dominant model of mental illness is
the moral/punitive one and for the related claim that, under a moral/punitive
paradigm, social utility is created through the instrumental punishment of
people with such illnesses. Of course, mental illness has a complex social
existence and this Article does not purport to discern all of its meanings.
Yet, there is substantial support in contemporary and historical legal,
academic, and popular sources for the claim that the moral/punitive and
medical/therapeutic conceptions of mental illness are the major social
meanings of mental illness, and that the dominance of the moral/punitive
model is linked to the maintenance of norms of individual responsibility.
Part III.A. 1 looks at responsibility rhetoric among scholars, lawmakers and
community members. Part III.A.2 considers the counterpoint between
excuses for people with actual mental illnesses and the "temporary insanity"
excuse for non-mentally ill people who break the law in ways consistent
with prevailing norms. Part III.B turns to the literature on alternative
sanctions to examine the failure of hospital-based confinement as an
alternative to prison for people with mental illnesses.
Part IV examines the meaning of the institution of the prison in
relation to the mentally ill. Tracing the historical interrelationship of the
confinement of the "mad" and the development of the prison, it shows that
the punitive confinement of people with mental illnesses has occurred
throughout Western history as a method of enforcing not only actual order
but of signaling commitments to social order. The use of the mentally ill as
[Vol. 96
2005] CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO MENTAL ILLNESS 223
the ultimate symbolic subjects of penal correction extends even to the
linguistic: In German, a term for people with mental illnesses in use through
the mid-20th century was "unzucht"-those who are out of "order"-while
the contemporaneous term for prison was "zuchthaus"-the house of order,
or that restores order. Unsurprisingly, long before Western society adopted
prison as the punishment for all sorts of legal transgressions, the original
occupants in all Western countries of "houses of correction" were the
mentally ill.
The Article closes with prescriptions for future directions. If we
believe that social institutions match and reinforce social meanings, then it
is the intersection of the cultural perception of the mentally ill as culpably
deviating from valued norms, and of the criminal system as appropriate to
reinforcing norms of responsibility and of order that leads to the
localization of the mentally ill in the criminal system. As Lawrence Lessig
describes in his work on "meaning architects," changes in systems flow
from changes in meanings.'0
I. SOCIAL MEANING AND THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
Following the work of "New Chicago School" theorists on the
relationship between social meaning and the economic analysis of the law,
this Article will argue that, because the dominant social meanings of mental
illness arise under a punitive paradigm, instead of a therapeutic paradigm,
reform efforts aimed at substituting treatment for incarceration will fail.
Liberating the huge economic value that could result from moving away
from the punitive model toward a treatment-based model will depend on a
shift in the social meanings associated with these diseases.
Social meaning is an essential term in the economic analysis of law-a
central insight of the so-called "New Chicago School" of law and
economics.'1  Elucidating the relationship between classical economic
10 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 943, 1008
(1995) [hereinafter Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning] (introducing concept of
"meaning managers" or "meaning architects").
"1 Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at 661-63, 673 (defining and
discussing the "new" Chicago school). The influence of norm theorists has spread to almost
every area of legal studies. See, e.g., id. at 673, 673 n.39; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 373-89 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan,
Social Influence]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31
VAL. U. L. REv. 579 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 2021, 2032 (1996); Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643 (1996) (including work by Eric Posner, Lisa Bernstein, David Charny, Jason
Scott Johnston, Edward B. Rock, Walter Kamiat, Richard H. McAdams, and Wendy J.
Gordon).
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analysis of law and social meaning, scholars proceeding in this school posit
that laws and policies that are rational under classical economic theory may
often fail because they do not account for the social meanings of the
practices that they attempt to influence. Laws that fail to account properly
for the social costs and incentives may influence members of the
community to defy the legal regime, while those that are consonant with the
relevant social meanings at issue may be more likely to achieve compliance.
The "social meaning turn" in legal scholarship aims to expand
economic analysis to account for the real, yet often invisible, social costs
and benefits that community members derive from their actions. 12 Rather
than rejecting economic analysis, or arguing that much human behavior is
not susceptible to economic analysis because it is part of the unquantifiable
world of the emotional or social, the New Chicago School investigates the
social meaning of the practice at issue, and the associated social costs and
benefits of deviating from the norms related to that practice. 13 Those social
costs and benefits then are built into a more robust account of how a
rational individual, operating within a specific social context, is likely to
act. 14
Deviation from a norm imposes a cost as a result of the meanings that
other community members ascribe to deviation and the penalty (however
indirect) assessed therefor.15  As Lessig explains, the cost "of deviating
from a social norm is ... a price, associated with a given action .... [O]ne
only understands that price by interpreting the action consistent with a
norm, or the action deviating from this norm, in its context."' 6  To
determine the costs of norm deviation, or to understand what levers may be
used to change a norm, its social meaning thus must be understood.
Departing from valued social norms may cause an actor to incur substantial
social costs-thus, where the penalty for breaking (or incentive for
conforming to) a law does not outweigh the social benefits or costs of
behaving consistently with extant norms, the actor who is maximizing his
or her long-term utility within a specific social context should choose to
12 Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 11, at 394-95; Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo
Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34
LAW & Soc'y REv. 973, 978-79 (2000) (describing and offering criticisms of efforts to
incorporate normative reasoning about the law and behavioral economics into classic
economic analysis of the law).
13 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STuD. 609, 610 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning] (critique of economic analyses
of law that fail to incorporate social costs is "internal to economic analysis").
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at 680-81.
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break the law."7 Conversely, an incentive or penalty scheme that harnesses
the social meanings at issue in the practice that is its target is more likely to
gain compliance, and may alter the social meaning of the practice itself. 18
The insights developed in this body of scholarship point to an
explanation for the persistence of the apparently inefficient regime of
incarcerating non-offending and nonviolent people with mental illnesses:
Social value is created through the public order response to people with
mental illnesses. Specifically, the public order response to issues presented
by people with mental illnesses, rather than a public health response, may
relate to social meanings of mental illness that construct mental illness as a
culpable failure of responsibility.
Because the criminal system reinforces personal and social
responsibility, and punishes deviance, social meanings that construct the
mentally ill as culpably irresponsible could create social value by
reinforcing the responsibility norm, at relatively low social cost, against a
disfavored outgroup. Although inefficient on its face, the criminal system
thus becomes the "expressively" logical location for people with mental
illnesses, once relevant social meanings of mental illness are taken into
account. The path toward substituting a public order response for a public
health response then becomes clear: initiatives to relocate the treatment of
people with mental illnesses from the criminal system to the health care
system, and to refocus the social response from the punitive to the
therapeutic, will only succeed if they also ambiguate or change the
predominant social meaning of mental illness from a failure of morality or
responsibility to a medicalized conception.
Any initiative to substitute treatment for punishment that does not first
change or ambiguate the social meanings of mental illness will affront the
valued social meanings of personal responsibility that are policed by the
criminal system. 19 As Kahan has argued, legal regimes and policies that are
economically rational but that run counter to a dominant social meaning
about the practice at issue will be "politically stillborn" because the
narrowly efficient alternative has failed to account for the social meaning,
or the "work," that the entrenched regime performs in maintaining certain
17 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2024-25.
18 Id. (exploring "how legal 'statements' might be designed to change social norms").
19 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1863 (2000) (arguing
that "[c]riminal law's influence comes from its operation as a societal mechanism through
which the force of social norms is realized and by which the force of internal moral
principles is strengthened").
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social meanings.20 In fact, this has been the case: there is a long history of
well-intentioned reform efforts aimed at changing the response to people
with mental illnesses from punitive to therapeutic that have foundered on
social meaning.21  Conversely, legislative efforts that support the
incarceration of people with mental illnesses, but in fact offer little or no
gains in public safety, nevertheless win substantial support.
22
II. USES OF CORRECTIONS FACILITIES AS CONFINEMENT CENTERS FOR
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES AND ASSOCIATED COSTS
"It is deplorable and outrageous that ... prisons appear to have become a repository
for a great number of mentally ill citizens. Persons who, with psychiatric care, could
fit well into society, are instead locked away, to become wards of the state's penal
system. Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they may be confined in conditions that
nurture, rather than abate, their psychoses."
- Judge William Wayne Justice, Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex.
1999).
A. INCARCERATION AND "CRIMINALIZATION" OF PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESSES
Nationwide, there are far more severely mentally ill individuals
confined in prisons and jails than treated in all mental health facilities
collectively. Annually, over 300,000 adults and children with mental
illnesses 23-many of whom have committed only a public order infraction
20 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 13, at 617 (describing the repeated failures of
movements to substitute alternative sanctions for incarceration due to the failure of
alternative sanctions to communicate the unequivocal condemnation of law-breaking
signaled by incarceration).
21 Much scholarship has been performed on the cultural history of mental illness and of
different efforts aimed at reforming the treatment of people with such diseases in Europe and
the United States. This Article will not recapitulate this extensive history but draws on it
illustratively to demonstrate the failures therapeutically-motivated reform efforts. For two
excellent overviews, see Roy PORTER, MADMEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADHOUSES, MAD
DOCTORS, AND LUNATICS (2004), and THE CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, 1800-1965 (Roy Porter & David Wright eds., 2003).
22 See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (discussing state and federal limitation
or elimination of the insanity defense); infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text
(discussing New York criminal involuntary commitment statute).
23 The terms "mental illness" or "mental illnesses" cover a diverse collection of diseases
that range in severity and vary in their causes, symptoms, and treatments. This Article
focuses exclusively on severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
These diseases are considered "severe" because, if untreated, they substantially impair daily
life functioning (i.e., basic self-care) and most major life activities (e.g., the ability to hold a
job). Sufferers require ongoing psychiatric treatment and supportive services in order to
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or no offense at all-are confined in state and federal prisons, jails, and
juvenile corrections facilities.2 4 A mere 60,000 people with such conditions
are treated annually in medical facilities. 25  Thus, for every one person
treated in a hospital, about five people are treated, or merely confined, in
penal facilities.2 6
Prisons have become the largest mental health facilities in the United
States. For example, the Los Angeles County Jail holds up to 3300 people
with mental illnesses per day, more than any state hospital or mental health
facility in the United States.27  Similarly, New York's Rikers Island jail
complex holds about 3000 mentally ill inmates each day, making it "the
state's largest psychiatric facility. 2 8 The 2000 Census of state and federal
function in the community. This definition of mental illness is consistent with those used by
the studies on which this Article relies for its statistics, ensuring, to the greatest extent
possible, an "apples to apples" comparison across sources. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV'TS, supra note 4, at 11 (referencing U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 45,46 (1999)); CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y.
& THE URBAN JUSTICE CTR., PRISONS AND JAILS-HoSPITALS OF LAST RESORT: THE NEED
FOR DIVERSION AND DISCHARGE PLANNING FOR INCARCERATED PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS IN NEW YORK 3 n.3, 6 (1999) [hereinafter CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y.]; E. FULLER TORREY
ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL
HOSPITALS 15 (1992); T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for
Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 283, 287 n.20 (1997). These disorders qualify as the "major psychoses" under the
DSM-IV, the standard nomenclature of mental illness used by health practitioners published
by the American Psychiatric Association. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
24 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting
284,000 incarcerated people with mental illnesses; further reporting 548,000 on probation).
Figures for 2003 can be extrapolated from the 2003 Bureau of Justice Statistics census of
prisons and jails. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that approximately 16% of all
people incarcerated in state prisons (16.2%) and jails (16.3%), and approximately 7% (7.4%)
of inmates in federal prisons, have a mental illness as defined in this Article. Id. at 1. For
2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 1,380,776 people were confined in state
prisons and local jails, and 691,301 people were confined in federal prisons. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 tbl.1. Applying the percentages in the Bureau's
report on the prevalence of mental illness in prisons and jails, supra, to the totals reported on
the 2003 mid-year report, in 2003 there were approximately 197,883 people with mental
illnesses in state prison, 112,682 in jails, and 11,786 in federal prisons, or a total of 322,352.
25 Michael Winerip, Bedlam on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, § 6, at 42
(reporting 61,700 people with mental illnesses treated annually in in-patient mental health
facilities).
26 id.
27 COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, supra note 4, at 6 (citing Treatment Not Jail: A Plan to Re-
build Community Mental Health, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 17, 1999, at B6).
28 Winerip, supra note 25.
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prisons reports that the "primary . . .or secondary function" of over 150
prisons nationwide is "mental health confinement. 2 9
The extraordinary proportion of people with mental illnesses confined
in criminal facilities versus treated in medical facilities does not stem from
their higher rate of criminality. Federal and state statistics show that people
with mental illnesses do not engage in more unlawful conduct than people
who do not have such illnesses. 30 Rather, features of community and law
enforcement responses to people with mental illnesses and the absence of a
viable public health alternatives, cause them to be "significantly
overrepresented in the criminal justice system., 3 1 Government studies find
that "[m]ost of these individuals have committed only minor infractions,
more often the manifestation of their illness than the result of criminal
intent,' '32 nuisance offenses such as disturbing the peace, intoxication, and
fare-beating.33
In fact, many jailed adults with mental illnesses have not been charged
with any unlawful conduct. Rather, jails frequently hold people with
mental illnesses because there is no other place to accommodate them.34 In
a survey of jails nationwide, 30 percent reported incarcerating mentally ill
29 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS 4 (2000). It is also worth
noting that although incarceration may exacerbate the illnesses of prison inmates, it is not
causing the prevalence of mental illnesses found in them. Most mentally ill individuals in
the prison system have received a diagnosis of mental illness prior to admission to criminal
detention. CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 19. A 1997 HHC Office of Correctional
Health Services study found that 68% of inmates had had contact with the mental health
system prior to incarceration. Id. at 19 n.61.
30 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 9 (presenting
statistics for federal and state systems).
31 COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT:
PROJECT OVERVIEW 2 (2002) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW).
32 NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNTIES, FACT SHEET: DIVERTING THE MENTALLY ILL FROM JAIL
(2004) (nationwide study of counties, referring to the 160,000 people with mental illnesses
held in county prisons and jails); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND
INMATES, supra note 4, at 9 (finding that approximately half of mentally ill inmates in state
prisons had been convicted of nonviolent offenses).
33 CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 5 n.13 (citing Patricia G. Bames, Safer Streets
at What Cost?, 84 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (1998)) (reporting results from Texas that about 63% of
repeat public order, or "quality of life," offenders are homeless); WILLIAM R. KELLY, CTR
FOR CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. RES., UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, BROKEN WINDOWS &
BROKEN LIVES: ADDRESSING PUBLIC ORDER OFFENDING IN AUSTIN (1998), available at
http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/cccjr/research/bwribback.htm.
34 Stone, supra note 23, at 291; TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 43.
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people with no charges against them.35  Although under constitutional
habeas corpus protections it is unlawful for the state to detain an individual
criminally without charge, several states have enacted legislation under
their police power specifically to permit the jailing of mentally ill
individuals without charges.36 Officials in other states engage in the same
practice absent specific authorizing legislation.37 In South Carolina,
according to one study, over 40 percent of mentally ill men and women
incarcerated in jails had no criminal charges pending against them.38 In
Louisiana, the same finding has been made as to nearly 30 percent of the
state's severely mentally ill jail inmates.39
These statistics may understate the number of people incarcerated
because of mental illness.40 Law enforcement officers across the country
have reported that they "invent" charges against mentally ill individuals in
order to bring them into jails.41 A West Virginia jail official, for example,
reported that he believed a local psychiatric hospital releases its patients
35 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 44 (citing study by the National Association for the
Mentally Ill (NAMI) and the Public Citizen's Health Research Group) (29%, or 403, of the
jails reported this practice).
36 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-105(1.1) (West 1994); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 573.00 1(e) (Vernon 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-73 (Michie 2005), repealed
by id. § 37.2.
37 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 44. States with the highest percentage of jails
reporting that they confine people with mental illnesses without charges include South
Carolina (41% of jails reporting holding uncharged people with mental illnesses), Louisiana
(28%), and Washington (25%). Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. The figure for Louisiana is 28%. Id.
40 Linda A. Teplin, Policing the Mentally Ill: Styles, Strategies, and Implications, in JAIL
DIVERSION FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 10, 12-14 (Henry J. Steadman ed., 1990) (suggesting that
many severely mentally ill are arrested because the police view a mental health referral as
unavailable). For a discussion of "mercy arrests," see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-
EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 21, n.35 (2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usal003/usa1003.pdf.
41 Stone, supra note 23, at 292-94. Stone states that "many persons with mental
disorders are charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses just to get them off the
streets and as a means of obtaining mental health treatment that is not available in a civil, as
opposed to a criminal, setting." Id. at 292-93. For example, a Florida jail director reported
"routinely" holding uncharged mentally ill individuals for "up to six weeks" in paper gowns
because of the lack of available hospital beds. TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 45; see also
Stone, supra note 23, at 294. Similarly, an Arizona sheriff reported fabricating charges




"too easily." 42 To correct the hospital's "mistakes," he reported inventing
charges on which to detain mentally ill individuals.4 3
Through a combination of increased likelihood of arrest, re-arrest, and
detention without charge or on spurious charges, people with mental
illnesses are significantly more likely than other people to spend time in
criminal confinement without having committed more lawbreaking acts.
44
According to Senate testimony, "up to 40 percent of adults who suffer from
a serious mental illness will come into contact with the ... criminal justice
system at some point in their lives," often "unnecessarily.
'A5
Criminal confinement because of mental illness affects U.S. children
as well. In July 2004, the House Committee on Government Reform issued
a study46 that found, across the United States, "the inappropriate
incarceration of youth [with serious mental disorders]," some as young as
seven years old,47 who have been "placed in detention without any criminal
charges pending against them. 4 8  In the period covered by the survey,
about "11% of all youth incarcerated at these facilities" were non-
42 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 47.
43 Id. (quoting a sheriff who stated, "[I]f the mental institutions will not hold them, I
will").
44 Women with a serious mental illness are six times more likely to be incarcerated than
women without such diseases, while men with such illnesses are four times more likely to be
incarcerated than men without them. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra
note 31, at 2 (citing Judith F. Cox et al., A Five-Year Population Study of Persons Involved
in the Mental Health and Local Correctional Systems, 28 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES &
RES. 177 (2001)) (figures based on study of the New York state prison system).
45 Sen. Patrick Leahy, Statement Before Executive Business Meeting (Oct. 23, 2003) (in
support of S. 1194, the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act Of 2003).
46 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4. The Special
Investigations Division of the House Committee surveyed every juvenile detention facility in
the United States. Id. at i (stating that the study is the first to survey the criminal detention
of mentally ill juveniles nationwide). Detention facility administrators in forty-nine states
responded to the survey, with 75% of all facilities responding. Id. New Hampshire failed to
respond. Id. at 4-5. The Committee's report defines juvenile detention facilities as "secure
correctional facilities" but "does not refer to the juvenile prison system, where youth who are
convicted of crimes ... serve their sentences." Id. at 3.
47 Id. at i, 6. Additionally, 117 facilities reported incarcerating children aged ten and
younger based on mental illness alone. Id. at 6.
48 See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4 at i. The
House of Representatives also found the confinement of youth with psychiatric diagnoses
who had committed offenses ranging in severity. Id. at i. The mental illnesses suffered by
these children principally include depression, schizophrenia, eating disorders, and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 9. This Article excludes from discussion the confinement of
children with non-psychiatric disabilities such as retardation.
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offenders; 49 corrections facilities in thirty-three states "report[ed] holding
youth with mental disorders without any charges against them" because
"[n]o other place would accept the child[ren]. 5 °
The prevalence of people with mental illnesses in criminal
confinement, and the role that mental illness itself plays in causing adults
and children to become criminally confined, has led reform-minded law
makers to conclude that "[w]e have basically made mental illness a crime in
this country."'"
B. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN COSTS OF INCARCERATING PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL ILLNESSES
"We cannot afford to maintain that practice [of confining violent offenders for life] if
we continue incarcerating nonviolent offenders or misdemeanants who are in prison
or jail only because they have a mental illness."
- Senator Robert Thompson, Chair, U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee.
5 2
The confinement of adults and children with mental illnesses in penal
facilities comes at an extraordinarily high cost to the U.S. economy, not to
mention to the people who are incarcerated. The direct costs of the public
order response to people with mental illnesses consist of the costs of
involvement in the criminal justice system from arrest through incarceration
and release. Indirect costs consist of the lost productivity of the person with
the mental illness (due to untreated illness, confinement, and premature
death (suicide)), and of the family members who provide unpaid care for
49 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at ii, 8.
Relatedly, many families are forced to relinquish custody of their children to juvenile justice
or child welfare agencies exclusively so that the children could receive mental health
services. See Nowhere to Turn: Must Parents Relinquish Custody in Order to Secure Mental
Health Services for Their Children?: Hearing Before the Governmental Affairs Comm.,
108th Cong. (2003) (opening statement of Senate Chairman Susan Collins); see also GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE. JUSTICE.: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD
PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING STATES REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PLACED
SOLELY TO OBTAIN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (2003).
50 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at 5.
51 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2 (quoting Judge
Steven Leifman, Miami Dade County Court, Fla.) (internal quotations omitted); see also THE
PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE:
TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 43-44 (2003) (calling current public
order paradigm the "'unnecessary criminalization of nonviolent adult[s] and juvenile[s]' with
mental illnesses").
52 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3.
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them.53 An additional and substantial indirect cost is the cost of suffering
from a major, untreated or undertreated disease. 54 Although the total direct
and indirect costs cannot be calculated using existing data,55 estimates of
even the partial direct costs, costs attributable to incarceration alone, are
immense. A conservative estimate, as set forth below, is that state prisons
spend about $4.75 billion annually exclusively to incarcerate nonviolent
mentally ill inmates. State governments particularly feel the burden,
arguing in a recent report of state governments that "the fiscal implications
make it impossible to ignore the growing number of people with mental
illness in the criminal justice system. ' 56  Federal lawmakers also
increasingly recognize that criminally confining non-offending and non-
violent people with mental illnesses imposes massive costs on the criminal
system and deprives the economy of the productivity that could be liberated
through treatment.57
53 These estimates of economic cost do not attempt to monetize, and therefore do not
account for, indirect but important human costs imposed on people with mental illnesses and
their families resulting from incarceration, such as, for example, the exacerbation of
psychiatric disease in the prison environment, reduced opportunities resulting from the fact
of prior incarceration, and dignitary and status-related losses resulting from incarceration.
54 See Frank A Sloan et al., Alternative Approaches to Valuing Intangible Health Losses:
The Evidence for Multiple Sclerosis, 17 J. HEALTH ECON. 475, 490 (1998) (calculating
intangible losses of suffering from a chronic disease, measured on a willingness-to-pay
model by sufferers of the disease, as ranging between $375,000 and $880,000). For
discussion of methods to value the indirect costs (or intangible losses) imposed by disease,
see George W. Torrance, Utility Approach to Measuring Health-Related Quality of Life, 40
J. CHRONIC DISEASES 593-600 (1987); George W. Torrance, Measurement of Health State
Utilities for Economic Appraisal, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 1-30 (1986). These foundational
approaches limit their calculations to the intangible costs associated narrowly with a disease
state, such as suffering; they may not account for additional costs that may be imposed by
social stigmas related to specific diseases.
55 Kathryn J. Bennett et al., Cost-Utility Analysis in Depression: The McSad Utility
Measure for Depression Health States, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1171, 1171 (2000) (stating
that cost-utility analysis applied to determining the total economic burden of physical
diseases has not been widely applied to psychiatric diseases; suggesting applications of
utility theory to the calculation of the costs of psychiatric illnesses).
56 COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3. Corrections
administrators also contend that the incarceration of people with mental illnesses is creating
significant budgetary concerns for prisons, arguing that "[tihe sooner we get people with
mental illness who don't represent a threat to public safety out of the corrections system...
the more likely we are to realize the savings .... " An Examination of S. 1194, The Mentally
Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing Before Comm. On the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 159-60 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Reginald A.
Wilkinson, President, Association of State Correctional Administrators).
57 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3 (quoting Senator
Robert Thompson, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee).
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Holding aside justice concerns, the direct and indirect costs of
incarcerating offenders constitute a rational expenditure, under the classical
liberal calculus, if the benefits in public safety and deterrence equal or
exceed the costs of incarceration." Yet, many of the costs incurred as a
result of the public order response to people with mental illnesses produce
no quantifiable benefits. Even insofar as the public order response to
people with mental illnesses produces utility, the net utility of incarcerating
an offender with a severe mental illness relative to a matched, non-mentally
ill offender will be lower because of the higher costs associated with
incarcerating a mentally ill person and the reduced impact on deterrence.5 9
1. Direct Costs
Direct costs of responding through the criminal system to the public
health and public order problems posed by untreated or undertreated mental
illness include costs of arrest, jail detention, judicial and legal resources,
incarceration, and probation costs. Although costs are incurred at every
step of the criminal process, the major costs result from incarceration in
jails and prisons. It is "significantly more expensive to incarcerate
individuals with mental illness than other inmates" convicted of equivalent
offenses.6 ° In fact, it is about 75% more expensive to incarcerate people
with mental illnesses than people without them. 6' For the cost of one
58 It is not within the scope of this Article to ascertain whether incarceration across other
offender categories results in net costs or benefits to society.
59 The exception here would be for the small percentage of particularly violent mentally
ill offenders whose confinement is required on public safety grounds only. Such offenders
comprise approximately three percent of all inmates with severe mental illnesses. See CoRR.
ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 13 (I have extrapolated from figures provided for the New
York City corrections system). However, it would be reasonable to argue that confining
such an offender in a secure psychiatric facility would yield a higher net utility than
confinement in a prison. This conclusion is consistent with the practice of certain prison
systems, which in fact do shift the most violent mentally ill offenders out of prisons to secure
psychiatric facilities that are better equipped to handle them. See id at 15-16.
60 Hearing, supra note 56 (testimony of Reginald A. Wilkinson).
61 Id. The average cost of incarcerating an offender in state prison is $80 per day, or
$29,200 annually. Id. Incarcerating a mentally ill inmate, because of the additional
disciplinary, restrictive, medical and other resources required, costs approximately $140 per
day, or $51,100 per year. Id. (citing average figures for the state of Pennsylvania).
Similarly, the average annual cost to incarcerate a non-mentally ill inmate in New York State
is about $32,000. N.Y.S. DEP'T OF CORR. SERVS., 1996-97 PER CAPITA COST REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 4/01/96-3/31/97.
The daily cost figure cited above is an average across all offenders, both non-mentally
ill and mentally ill. See Hearing, supra note 56 (testimony of Reginald A. Wilkinson).
Accordingly, the average cost to incarcerate non-mentally ill offenders is less than $80 per
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mentally ill inmate, a state could incarcerate 1.75 non-mentally ill inmates
at no budgetary increase.
Beyond higher daily costs, people with mental illnesses also are more
costly to incarcerate because they are sentenced to and serve longer
sentences than other offenders convicted of equivalent crimes.62 Mentally
ill offenders on average are sentenced to twelve months longer than other
inmates in prison for the same categories of offenses.63 Yet, even holding
sentence length equal, a mentally ill inmate will serve more time: If an
inmate tries to kill himself or herself, or "acts out," he or she may be placed
64in solitary confinement, and may have time added to his or her sentence.
Accounting for sentence- and behavior-related factors, the average mentally
ill inmate serves fifteen months longer than a non-mentally ill inmate
convicted of the same type of offense.65 Longer incarceration affects all
categories of mentally ill offenders, from felons to misdemeanants.66
More time served means a higher total cost of incarceration. At the
average daily costs of $140 to incarcerate a mentally ill inmate, the
difference in time served costs nearly $64,00--above and beyond the costs
of the base sentence length for the offense. These higher individual costs
add up to staggering overall costs. Using figures for state prisons alone, the
cost of incarceration of nonviolent mentally ill inmates is about $4.75
billion annually. This estimate does not include costs incurred in state jails,
federal prisons and jails, and juvenile corrections facilities.67 Assuming
conservatively that these other systems collectively accommodate one
quarter the number of nonviolent mentally ill inmates as state prisons, and
at equivalent costs, then the total annual direct incarceration costs for
day, as the $80 per day figure includes in it the higher cost of incarcerating mentally ill
inmates.
62 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 7-8; see also
Frank J. Porporino & Laurence L. Motiuk, The Prison Careers of Mentally Disordered
Offenders, 18 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 29, 42 (1995); Michael Winerip, The Way We Live
Now: The Juror's Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, § 6, at 29.
63 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 8 & tbl. 12.
64 CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
65 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 8 & tbl. 12. On
average, a non-mentally ill inmate serves 88.3 months in prison while a mentally ill inmate
serves 103.4 months. Id. at 8 tbl.12.
66 Marjorie Rock & Gerald Landsberg, County Mental Health Directors' Perspectives on
Forensic Mental Health Developments in New York State, 25 ADMIN. & POL'Y IN MENTAL
HEALTH 327, 327 (1998).
67 Costs of confining non-offending mentally ill youth in detention centers are not
available, but center administrators call secure detention centers "the most expensive mental
health ward for youth .. " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra
note 4, at 8.
[Vol. 96
2005] CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO MENTAL ILLNESS 235
nonviolent and nonoffending people with mental illnesses would be
approximately $5.95 billion annually.68
An irony in light of the tremendous taxpayer expense of paying for
mental health confinement through the criminal justice system is that
increased mental health coverage through the insurance system would cost
very little. A study by the Rand Corporation found that if private insurance
plans were to cover psychiatric conditions on the same terms as other




The indirect costs of the public order response to mental health issues
may exceed the direct costs but are more complex to estimate. The
President's Commission on Mental Health estimates that annual economic
indirect cost of mental illnesses for the entire U.S. population is $79
billion.70 The figure does not include lost utility from poorer quality of life
for people suffering from untreated or undertreated diseases. Severe mental
illnesses account for nearly 25% of all disability (hence, lost productivity)
across industrialized countries, 71 while all communicable diseases and all
types of cancer each account for less than 5%.72
These productivity losses do not result directly from a preference for a
public order over a public health response to mental illnesses. Yet, they are
linked73: productivity losses and death rates resulting from mental illnesses,
as with many other types of illnesses, are not fixed but correlate to access
68 This estimate does not even capture the consumption of judicial, legal, and police
resources involved in processing a mentally ill person through the criminal system.
69 Associated Press, Mental Care Coverage Costs Little, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1997, at A20.
70 PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N, supra note 51, at 3 (citing D.P. Rice & L.S.
Miller, The Economic Burden of Schizophrenia: Conceptual and Methodological Issues and
Cost Estimates, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 321-34 (Moscarelli et al. eds., 1996)). Approximately
$63 billion results from lost productivity. Id. Most of the remainder consists of $12 billion
in mortality costs (that is, lost productivity caused by premature death) and $4 billion of lost
productivity of care givers (usually uncompensated family members). Id.
71 PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N, supra note 51, at 19.
72 Id. at 20 fig. 1.1. According to the World Health Organization, suicide causes more
deaths every year than homicide or war. Id. at 20 (citing WHO, WORLD REPORT ON
VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (2002)) ("[S]uicide is the leading cause of violent deaths worldwide,
outnumbering homicide or war"). Worldwide, suicide accounts for 49.1% of violent deaths,
homicide for 31.3%, and war-related deaths for 18.6%. Id. at 21 fig.1.2.
73 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 4, at 26 ("[T]he ideal mechanism to prevent
people with mental illness from entering the criminal justice system is the mental health
system itself.").
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to treatment. Greater rates of treatment ameliorate disease, enhance the
well-being of the individual and the people in his or her constellation, and
reduce productivity losses.
74
A significant driver of lost productivity is the use of prisons and jails
as the primary providers of mental health services. Once released from
prison or jail, a mentally ill individual experiences the abrupt withdrawal of
any treatment he or she received in prison, and "decompensate[s]" rapidly
into homelessness and re-arrest.75 This use of prisons as primary mental
health care providers results in "the cycle that has ...made jails and
prisons . . . the new psychiatric institutions. 76
The costs of incarceration and associated undertreatment of psychiatric
illness, although difficult to quantify, are real. These costs represent an
additional category of pure social loss. That is, assuming society receives
benefit from the satisfaction of retributive or other urges toward offenders
through their incarceration, no further benefit is conferred on society by the
special suffering of one class of prisoners unrelated to their offense.77
3. Decreased Utility from Incarceration
Classical deterrence rationales cannot account for the disproportionate
incarceration of people with mental illnesses, nor justify its extraordinary
cost. According to classical deterrence theory, the law should punish
where, and to the extent that, inflicting punishment maximizes
social welfare.78 In the liberal formulation, the state is justified in coercing
74 TuE PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N, supra note 51, at 19 (noting that earlier
detection and treatment of mental disorders will result in "shorter and less disabling course
of impairment"); see also id. at 29 (discussing productivity loss). Treatment for mental
illnesses also can improve quality of life vastly. As the monetization of quality of life
enhancements is speculative, it has not been included in calculations here. However, an
account of the benefits of treatment would be incomplete without a consideration of the
impact on the well-being of people treated.
75 CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
76 id.
77 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1193, 1223 (1985) (analyzing utility of specific forms of punishment based on whether
society "receives" the disutility the offender suffers).
78 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 WORKS 126-35 (John Hill Burton ed.,
1998) (1843) (asserting that whether good or bad, the moral quality of an individual's
motivations or character should not affect punishment independently of the
individual's propensity to frustrate the maximization of social welfare); see also RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-31 (5th ed. 1992) (presenting an economic model
to evaluate criminal punishment).
The economic model of deterrence originates in eighteenth century legal and economic
thought. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 209 (1968) (explaining that the eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers Beccaria and
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an individual only to prevent harm; if incarceration does not further public
safety specifically and generally, incarceration is not justified.
79
Yet, not only are costs higher, the net utility of incarcerating people
with mental illnesses is lower because the safety and deterrence gains from
incarcerating the average mentally ill prisoner are lower. For the substantial
number of adults and children with mental illnesses who are incarcerated
without charge or on fabricated charges, the costs of incarceration are not
offset by any gains in public safety or deterrence and thus are a pure loss.
For example, juvenile detention facilities alone spend an estimated $100
million each year simply to warehouse without treatment non-offending
children awaiting mental health services.8  Because the criminal
confinement of non-offenders cannot serve either deterrence or
incapacitation, their confinement is irrational in economic terms and under
classical principles of liberalism and deterrence theory.
The specific deterrence gains from incarcerating mentally ill
individuals who have been convicted of offenses also are lower. Specific
deterrence as a result of incarceration, as judged on recidivism rates, is
demonstrably poorer as to mentally ill offenders. Mentally ill inmates in
state prisons are nearly 90% more likely than non-mentally ill inmates to
have been convicted of eleven or more prior offenses; in federal prisons,
mentally ill inmates are nearly 350% more likely than non-mentally ill
inmates to have been convicted of eleven or more prior offenses.
8
'
Bentham "explicitly applied an economic calculus"). The standard economic model
calculates optimal deterrence as the product of the value of the penalty (p) and the
probability of detection (pdet), where the value of the penalty depends upon cost, or harm
(h), the crime causes. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for
Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 736-37, 740 (2001). This formula in theory
establishes the efficient level of punishment because it creates incentives for an actor to obey
the prohibition where the predicted punishment cost exceeds the value from committing the
offense. Id.
79 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY passim (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991) (1859);
see also John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), reprinted in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 110 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) ("If
punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interest of society it is justifiable,
otherwise it is not, .... ) (citing LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 1750-1833 (1948)).
80 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at ii. This
estimate does not include any of the additional expenses in service provision and staff time
associated with holding youth in urgent need of mental health services. 1d; see also id. at 9-
10 (reporting that over one quarter of detention facilities where youths are held for mental
health reasons provide no mental health treatment; further reporting that staff at over half of
all facilities receive "very poor or no training" in handling or treating children suffering from
mental illnesses).
81 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 5, Tab 6. In
state prisons, 10% of mentally ill inmates and 5.3% of non-mentally ill inmates have been
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Regardless of the causes of recidivism among this population, 2 the
markedly higher recidivism rate shows that society receives less specific
deterrence benefit from their incarceration relative to other offenders.
This diminished benefit is not offset by other factors such as, e.g., a greater
public safety benefit, as at least half of state mentally ill inmates and two-
thirds of federal mentally ill inmates are incarcerated for nonviolent
offenses, 4 and, as noted, many jail inmates may not have committed any
offense. There can be no gain in specific deterrence from incarceration
where the individual did not offend in the first place.
4. Substitute Response Costs and Benefits
Responding to problems presented by acute mental illness through law
enforcement and emergency medical interventions costs more and produces
less benefit than an integrated public health response. A study by New
York State found that the state can provide complete, integrated services for
a severely mentally ill person, including supervised housing, daily nurse
visits, mental health services, and medication, for $25,000 per year.85 This
is less than half the direct cost of incarceration and one quarter the cost of a
combination of ineffective emergency room treatment and law enforcement
responses.86 Similarly, the President's Commission on Mental Health has
found that permanent supportive, supervised housing is cost effective
relative to the combination of law enforcement and emergency medical
responses. These substantial direct savings do not factor in the economic
convicted of eleven or more prior offenses, an 89% difference. Id. In federal prisons, 9.7%
of mentally ill inmates and 2.2% of non-mentally ill inmates have been convicted of eleven
or more prior offenses, a 341% difference. Id.
82 Various hypotheses have been advanced to account for the discrepancy in recidivism
between mentally ill and non-mentally ill offenders. Mental illness itself may prevent a
mentally ill offender from being deterrable. Where the biological symptoms of untreated
mental illness constitute the offense (as with some nuisance or property offenses), the notion
of deterrence simply may not apply. Some researchers contend that the very use of prisons
as the main source of mental health treatment causes people with mental illnesses to cycle in
and out of prison. CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
83 Posner, supra note 77, at 1223 (discussing deterrence and recidivism). For Posner's
analysis of the insanity defense, see id. at 1223-24.
84 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 4 tbl.5
(showing that approximately one half of mentally ill state prisoners, and two-thirds of
mentally ill federal prisoners, were incarcerated for nonviolent offenses).
85 Michael Winerip, Report Faults Care of Man Who Pushed Woman Onto Tracks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at BI (citing a confidential New York State report obtained by The
New York Times).
86 id.
87 THE PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N, supra note 51, at 42-43 (citing savings of
$16,282 per person per year of accommodating mentally ill homeless individuals in
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losses avoided by preventing law-breaking behavior and obviating the need
to process a mentally ill offender through the criminal justice system before
and after incarceration. Such an integrated response also may produce
actual benefits in the form of enhanced economic productivity and
individual well-being.
The economic and human problems presented by the public order
response to people with mental illnesses have not gone unnoticed:
initiatives and reports by, among others, a presidential commission,88 a
Congressional commission, 89 the U.S. Senate,90 the Department of Justice, 91
the Department of Health and Human Services,92 the General Accounting
Office, 93 a commission of state governments and corrections officials, 94 and
major advocacy groups have focused on the disutility of a public order
response to the issues posed by people with mental illnesses.95 These
groups uniformly have concluded that addressing problems posed by people
with mental illnesses through the criminal justice system is harmful and
inefficient, and urge that steps be taken to relocate the center of intervention
from the criminal legal system to the public health system. Yet, no political
groundswell has emerged to shift from the public order to the public health
response and to liberate the value from such a shift.
supportive housing compared to previously-incurred annual costs for corrections, shelters,
and mental health interventions for the same individuals).
88 Exec. Order No. 13,263, 3 C.F.R. 233 (2002), reprinted in 67 Fed. Req. 22337 (May 3,
2002).
89 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4.
90 Hearing, supra note 56 (testimony of Reginald A. Wilkinson).
91 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4; U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 2003 REPORT, supra note 4 (reporting extensively on mentally ill individuals in
prisons and jails).
92 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., supra note 4.
93 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49.
94 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, supra note 4.
95 Among others, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40; MARTIN DRAPKIN, CIVIC
RESEARCH INST., MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF JAIL INMATES WITH MENTAL DISORDERS
(2003); CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 23.
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III. THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE PUBLIC ORDER RESPONSE TO PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES
A. THE NEW CHICAGO SCHOOL & THE "SOCIAL MEANING TURN"
"What or whom [a society] values" is shown by what and whom it
chooses to punish and how severely.96 Value can be implied from
punishment, by who is punished relative to whom else and to what extent.
The Part above outlined the prevalence of people with mental illness in
criminal confinement and showed that such people are punished more
severely (through longer sentences and a higher percentage of sentence
served, and, if uncharged or charged on spurious grounds, through
incarceration without having committed an offense) than their counterparts
without mental illnesses. At the same time, public health alternatives place
the least burden on taxpayers and produce far greater economic utility for
the community and well-being for individuals with mental illnesses. The
persistence of the public order response in the face of public health
alternatives indicates that a social value is placed on the criminal
confinement of people with mental illnesses.
The value placed on the criminal confinement of people with mental
illnesses cannot be direct economic utility because their incarceration is not
value positive. Rather, it is likely that the preference for the criminal
confinement of people with mental illnesses carries "expressive" value.
Legal regimes "are expressive; they carry meanings. 97  The meanings
carried and reinforced by a legal regime can be termed their "expressive
utility," which can be "incorporated into the social-welfare calculus" to
assess the efficiency of a legal regime and potential alternatives.98 If the
public has a taste for the "moral condemnation" of a particular category of
wrongdoers through the imposition of criminal liability, then the law
"creates social welfare ... when the law satisfies that demand. . .. "99
The welfare created through the satisfaction of a community's tastes
can transform an apparent economic loss into a social surplus, and cause the
apparently inefficient practice to be highly conserved. Sunstein illustrates
this point in a way that is entertaining but trenchant with his analysis of Joel
Waldfogel's economic critique of Christmas. In Waldfogel's The
Deadweight Loss of Christmas, Waldfogel finds that holiday gift exchange
96 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 13, at 614 (internal punctuation omitted); see also
Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 130 (1988).
97 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2021-22.
98 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 13, at 620 n.48.
99 Id. at 619.
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results in deadweight economic loss because gift givers expend time
searching for gifts that exceeds the value recipients place on that search
time and also because recipients derive less economic value from the gift
than they would from the same amount of cash.'00 Sunstein argues that this
critique misses the point and constitutes an incomplete economic analysis,
both for the same reason: Waldfogel fails to account for the social meanings
and concomitant social value of gift exchange instead of cash exchange in
the context of Christmas.' 0 ' The positive social meaning of gift giving fills
the "gap" between the deadweight loss found by (at least one) classical
economic analysis. Somewhat less whimsically, Kahan similarly
demonstrates that the apparent economic irrationality of imposing criminal
liability on corporations also may be rationalized by accounting for the
positive value community members place on satisfying their taste for the
punishment of wrongdoers, even when the wrongdoer is an insensate legal
entity." 2
Once social meaning is identified as the term that causes an otherwise
inefficient practice to create social utility, and thus to be conserved, a
conclusion is clear: To change the practice or legal regime-whether to
advance competing values or to achieve economic efficiencies-the specific
social meanings that maintain the practice must be put into contest.,
0 3
This raises the question of what the social meaning at issue is. Social
meanings are "the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions,
or statuses"--that is, "texts"-"within a particular context."' 0 4 Establishing
the social meaning of any given text is complex,1
0 5 though possible. 0 6
100 Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1328, 1328
(1993).
101 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2037.
102 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 13, at 618 (citing Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0.
Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323-24 (1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1492 (1996)).
103 Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 13, at 610 ("[C]ommunities... structure the
criminal law to promote the meanings they approve of and to suppress the ones they dislike
or fear. Economic analyses that ignore these expressive evaluations produce unreliable
predictions and uncompelling prescriptions.").
104 Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 10, at 951. A social meaning is
comprised of a "text" and a "context" that gives the text its meaning. Id. at 958. Together,
the "text, in context, activates the association." Id
105 Bernard E. Harcourt, Measured Interpretation: Introducing the Method of
Correspondence Analysis to Legal Studies, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 979, 983 (calling the
ascertainment of social meaning "one of the greatest challenges that interpretive legal
scholars and social scientists face"); see also, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and
Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181, 2188 (1996) ("Meanings are often highly
contestable and sometimes hard to know."). There may be a range of social meanings for
any given text. Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 10, at 955 ("Even if
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Numerous methods of ascertaining the meanings of texts in different
contexts have been proposed. 0 7 This Article does not purport to ascertain
definitively the many meanings of mental illness in relation to perceptions
of social order. Yet, drawing on empirical work from legal and social
sciences scholarship, it suggests that there are two conceptions or models of
mental illness at play in the culture. These are the moral/punitive
conception, which is the dominant model, and the medical/therapeutic
conception, which is subsidiary.
Under the moral/punitive model, mental illness is understood as a
failure of individual responsibility: People who behave in a manner
currently termed "mentally ill" are failing to control themselves and must
have greater measures of control imposed on them to bring them in line
with accepted behaviors. Under the medical/therapeutic view, by contrast,
mental illnesses are understood as diseases that require and respond to
medical treatment, as with any other disease.
The dominant social meaning, this Part argues, which is consistent
with the criminal law response to people with mental illnesses, has a
positive social value that is not captured either in economic or rights-based
critiques of the public order response to people with mental illnesses. It is
this positive social value that fills the apparent gap between the existing
regime and the theoretical, efficient alternative, causing the economically
wasteful regime to be preferred to treatment-based, cheaper alternatives.
Accordingly, this social meaning will need to be the focus of agents who
seek to reduce the economic and human costs of the public order-based
regime.
B. TWO MODELS OF MENTAL ILLNESS: THE MORAL/PUNITIVE AND
THE MEDICAL/THERAPEUTIC
Under the moral/punitive conception of mental illness, people with
mental illnesses are seen as expressing defects of will or character.
Following this view, people who act "mentally ill" are failing to control
themselves and must have greater measures of control imposed on them to
bring them in line with accepted behaviors. The view of mental illness as a
moral or character failing unites it with the important norm of individual
there is no single meaning, there is a range or distribution of meanings, and the question we
ask here is how that range gets made, and, more importantly, changed.").
106 Andrew Abbott, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 26 THEORY & SoC'Y 357, 358 (1997)
(arguing that social meanings are susceptible of rigorous analysis, allowing one to "think
formally about the social world").
107 See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 105, at 985 (proposing correspondence analysis as a
tool for determining social meanings).
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responsibility. The responsibility norm, that all individuals are responsible
for their conduct and its consequences except under certain narrow
exceptions, is foundational to the criminal law (and to the culture more
broadly).
Under a view that equates the correction of aberrant behavior by
people with mental illnesses with reinforcing the important norm of
responsibility for one's conduct, it would be unthinkable to excuse people
from the consequences of their actions on the ground of mental illness. The
historical and current resistance to conceiving of mental illnesses as being
beyond one's control like other diseases springs from the view that doing so
would excuse all kinds of bad behavior. The notion is that if "sick" people
are excused, then all kinds of bad behavior will be deemed "sick." This
conflation of the "mad" and the "bad," this argument runs, will bring about
a state of affairs where no one will be held accountable for bad acts. This
notion that mental illness must be policed as a failure of responsibility, and
that such punishment reinforces the norm of individual responsibility, finds
expression in legal scholarship, among mock and actual juries, and in the
beliefs and actions of lawmakers. The unacceptability of hospital-based
confinement as a potential "alternative sanction," discussed infra, also
attests to the primacy of the moral/punitive model over the
medical/therapeutic.
1. Responsibility Rhetoric Among Scholars, Lawmakers and Community
Members
People with mental illnesses are used instrumentally to effectuate and
support general notions of social responsibility, without taking into account
the fact that their actions may have been caused by a genuine physical
disease. Richard Bonnie, a scholar who has written extensively in favor of
restricting or eliminating the insanity defense, ° 8 argues that a narrowinsanity test has value because it permits the effectuation of normative
108 Richard J. Bonnie et al., The Case of Joy Baker, in CRiMINAL LAW 456, 456-64
(Richard Bonnie ed., 1997); PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND
DEBATE (Richard Bonnie ed., 1977); Richard J. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal
Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client
Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48 (1996) (surveying the decision processes of
139 attorney-client pairs in determining whether to plead insanity); Richard J. Bonnie, The
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539
(1993); Richard Bonnie & Norval Morris, Debate: Should the Insanity Defense Be
Abolished?, I J.L. & HEALTH 113, 119 (1987); Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the
Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983). Although it is not the purpose of this Article to
reprise arguments for or against the insanity defense, scholarship and legislative activity
around the insanity defense provides a wealth of material expressing views of people with
mental illnesses and of the relationship between mental illness and individual responsibility.
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judgment about individual responsibility. 109 He argues that the Model Penal
Code insanity test should be revised to eliminate consideration of whether a
defendant suffered from a "volitional" impairment resulting from a mental
disease or defect. 10 Bonnie's objection to the volitional prong is not that it
is inaccurate. Rather, he concedes that an actor may genuinely lack control
over his actions due to disease."' Yet, he contends, even in "compelling
cases of volitional impairment," mentally ill actors should be held
criminally accountable as if their actions resulted from intent, because their
exculpation "would be out of touch with commonly shared moral intuitions"
about responsibility.'"
2
Other scholars who advocate the elimination of a defense based on
"insanity" argue that the defense is both too restrictive and too permissive.
The excuse of insanity is too restrictive because, it is claimed, it favors loss
of control based on mental illness but fails to extend the same latitude to
people who have suffered the impact of negative exterior circumstances
such as poverty, drug use, and child abuse. It is too permissive, it is
claimed, because once a defense of insanity is permitted, then the door is
open for any form of hardship to form the basis for an excuse from guilt for
criminal conduct. Although most closely associated with Norval Morris,
this view has had numerous advocates over time.113
Bonnie and Morris represent the two major views on why people with
mental illnesses should be dealt with in the criminal system. The first view
is that punishment of people with mental illnesses serves a purpose, so the
impact of mental illness in causing lawbreaking behavior is irrelevant. The
second, more widely shared, view is a variation of the familiar slippery
slope argument; if the law allows any recognition that a person with a
severe illness cannot control their behavior, then no one will control their
behavior, and the world will go wild. At the heart of arguments typified by
Morris is the idea that mental "illness" is not a real phenomenon. Rather,
they imply, "illness" is merely a label applied to people who commit
blameworthy acts, instead of a set of real and treatable medical conditions
109 Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, supra note 108 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 197.
SId
112 id.
13 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); see also, e.g., RUDOLPH
JOSEPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 85-89 (1984); SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME: A STUDY OF CAUSES, PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 212-28,
341-42 (1967); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24-25 (1964); THOMAS
S. SZASz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL
HEALTH PRACTICES 123-46 (1963); Alexander D. Brooks, The Merits of Abolishing the
Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 125 (1985).
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distinct from simple bad behavior. This view was encapsulated neatly by a
speechwriter for Ronald Reagan, who argued:
If you commit a big crime then you are crazy, and the more heinous the crime the
crazier you must be .... [Y]ou can wait like a jackal and shoot a man in the head and
leave him for dead and buy your way out with clever lawyers and expensive
psychiatrists. Therefore you are not responsible, and nothing is your fault. 14
Of course, the statistics on people with mental illnesses in prison and
jail show the falsity of this view. People who commit big crimes may or
may not buy their way out with expensive lawyers, but they certainly don't
do it with expensive psychiatrists. The insanity defense rarely is invoked
and almost never succeeds.
Intermittently, federal and state legislators introduce bills to eliminate
the insanity defense based upon its putatively pernicious effect on notions
of individual responsibility and (equally putative) overuse.' 15 The comment
by a Montana state legislator introducing a bill to abolish the insanity
defense in his state illustrates the point: "I believe that criminal law should
presume that each of us is capable of free choice of behavior . . . . My
purpose with the bill is to hold people accountable for their criminal
acts.
1 16
Statements about the importance of limiting the federal insanity
defense show that these debates are symbolic: The incidence of insanity
defense pleas is so negligible that the only impact of narrowing the federal
insanity defense would be its symbolic effect in reinforcing norms of
responsibility and social meanings related to people with mental
illnesses."' Based on figures like those discussed in the note below, the
114 PEGGY NOONAN, WHAT I SAW AT THE REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL LIFE IN THE REAGAN
ERA 29 (1990).
115 Five states have abolished the insanity defense, replacing it with the general mens rea
approach common to other criminal inquiries. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.035 (LexisNexis 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999). For a discussion
of efforts to restrict or abolish the insanity defense for federal crimes, see LINCOLN CAPLAN,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984), and for an analysis
of insanity defense reform activity, see Lincoln Caplan, Not So Nutty: The Post-Dahmer
Insanity Defense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 1992, at 18.
116 Abolition of Mental Disease as a Defense: Hearing on H.B. 877 Before the Exec.
Sess. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 46th Mont. Leg. 12 (Feb. 20, 1979) (comments of
Representative Keedy).
117 In a study reviewing nearly one million felony indictments in eight states, an insanity
plea was entered in fewer than one percent (0.93%) of cases and succeeded in about one
quarter of one percent of cases (0.26%). Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and
Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334-35 (1991). Another review of half a million felony indictments
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federal taskforce on the insanity defense, the National Commission on the
Insanity Defense concluded, "The consensus of the experts is that the
insanity defense trial is an extremely rare event and a successful insanity
defense is even more rare.
1 18
Ronald Reagan's Attorney General, William French Smith, endorsed a
bill proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch to "effectively eliminate the [federal]
insanity defense,"119 because doing so, he argued, would "restor[e] the
balance between 'the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness.'" 20 The
"forces of law" would triumph again because eliminating the insanity
defense would send, he claimed, a strong message that people must be
responsible for all their actions. 121 President Reagan similarly endorsed the
bill, opining that not holding people with mental illnesses liable for their
offenses runs counter to popular feelings about "responsibility."'
122
Jurors, too, exhibit the twinned views that mental illness is a failure of
individual responsibility and that the punishment of people with mental
illnesses reinforces the responsibility norm. In one of the largest mock
juror studies of decision-making in a capital case, different jurors used the
actor's mental illness as a reason for giving a life sentence and for imposing
a death penalty. Twenty-four percent of mock jurors imposed death based
on a normative responsibility concept, stating that "mental illness is no
in four states similarly found an insanity plea rate of about one percent and an insanity
acquittal rate of about one quarter of one percent. HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND
AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATION INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 27-28 tbl.2.2 (1993). Numerous
other studies have produced similar findings. See M. L. Criss & D. R. Racine, Impact of
Change in Legal Standard for Those Adjudicated Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 1975-
1979, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 261 (1980); I. K. Packer, Insanity Acquittals
in Michigan 1969-1983: The Effects of Legislative and Judicial Changes, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 419 (1985); Richard A. Pasewark, The Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research
Literature, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357 (1981); Richard A. Pasewark, M.L. Pantle & Henry J.
Steadman, Characteristics and Disposition of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity in New York State, 1971-1976, 136 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 655 (1979); C.J. Stokman
& P.G. Heitrer, The Insanity Defense Reform Act in New York State, 1980-1983, 7 INT'L J. L.
& PSYCHIATRY 367 (1984). These studies are somewhat out of date, due to the explosion of
interest in the insanity defense after John Hinkley, Jr.'s anomalous insanity acquittal. State
and federal insanity defense pleas and acquittals are not regularly tracked or recorded by
governmental agencies.
118 NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15 (1983).
119 CAPLAN, supra note 115, at 111 (1984).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Lou Cannon, Two Years After Shooting; President Bears No Grudge, WASH. POST,
Mar. 30, 1983, at Al.
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excuse" because all people "should be responsible."' 123 Eighteen percent
imposed death because the defendant's failure to seek help (a demonstration
of irresponsibility) caused him to be responsible for his mental illness and
the consequences that flowed from it.
124
Actual insanity defense trials, though rare, also demonstrate that jurors
equate imposing liability on people with concededly severe mental illnesses
with supporting the norm of individual responsibility. The case of New
York v. Goldstein illustrates this point.' 25 Tried twice for the murder of a
woman he had pushed in front of a subway train, Andrew Goldstein, a
paranoid schizophrenic, raised a defense of insanity. The issue before each
jury was Goldstein's responsibility at the time of his act under New York's
insanity defense test; the first trial resulted in a hung jury, while the second
resulted in a conviction of second-degree murder.
Although the prosecution conceded that Goldstein suffered acute
paranoid schizophrenia, the prosecution portrayed him as playing on, or
playing up, psychiatric symptoms to escape responsibility. 26 They argued
that an acquittal would "send a message" that being mentally ill is a
"license" to commit violent crimes, 127 while a conviction would send the
message that suffering from mental illness does not abrogate
123 Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis
of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 125 (1987). For the raw
data, see id. at 124.
124 Id. at 125. For the raw data reported, see id. at 124. 20% also imposed death on the
argument that the defendant was faking: "Defendant is not crazy; could have fooled
psychiatrist." Id.
125 The case concerns the fatal attack on Kendra Webdale by Andrew Goldstein, a
paranoid schizophrenic. On January 3, 1999, after unsuccessfully attempting to gain
admission to hospitals throughout New York because he claimed he could not control his
violent impulses, Andrew Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale in front of an oncoming
subway train, killing her. Julian E. Barnes, Second Murder Trial Opens In Subway Shoving
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at B3. For a detailed recounting of Goldstein's attempts to
gain admission at various hospitals, see Michael Winerip, The Nation: Behind One Man's
Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, § 4, at 3. His first trial, in October and November of
1999, ended in a mistrial when the jury could not agree on the issue of his responsibility
under New York's insanity defense test. Julian E. Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails for Man
Who Threw Woman Onto Track, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at Al. His second trial, in
March of 2000, in which Goldstein also raised an insanity defense, resulted in a conviction
of second-degree murder. Id.
126 Julian E. Barnes, Judge Allows Lesser Charge in Trial of Subway Pusher, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at B3; see also David Rohde, Prosecutors Press Theory That Killer
Hates Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at B3 (stating that the prosecution "intensified an
already aggressive effort to vilify Mr. Goldstein as a calculating young man who used his
mental illness to escape punishment for his repeated attacks on women").
127 David Rohde, Mentally Ill Man's Kin Absent From His Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1999, § 1, at 43.
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responsibility. 28 In this way, the prosecution urged the jury to use their
determination whether a particular defendant could form culpable intent as
a vehicle to reinforce the norm of responsibility generally.
After the conviction, jurors' comments showed that they adopted the
prosecution's urging to use the responsibility determination about a
particular mentally ill individual as a way of supporting general norms of
responsibility. Jurors reported crediting testimony that Goldstein did not
froth at the mouth or drool, and considered his lack of drooling significant
to their responsibility determination. 129  Jurors stated that, although they
believed Goldstein was legally insane, he was guilty of murder because he
threw the victim instead of causing her to fall accidentally through "an
involuntary movement."'' 30  The jurors' cartoonish view of mental illness
suggests that they used the concept of "responsibility" as a conduit for
evaluative judgment, and that no set of realistic facts showing mental illness
could have influenced them to determine that mental illness relieved the
defendant of responsibility. 13 1 The principle guiding his determination, a
juror stated was that "w[e] have to be held accountable, all of us, for our
,,132
actions.
New York lawmakers reflected public concern about the perceived
threat posed by people with mental illnesses by framing legislative activity
about the mentally ill explicitly in terms of "responsibility." According to
New York governor George Pataki, the problem threatening New Yorkers
is that the mentally ill are not sufficiently "responsible."'' 33 This use of
"responsibility" arises in an ironic counterpoint to the notion of the
128 Id.
129 The prosecution emphasized through the testimony of several witnesses that
Goldstein did not drool, asking Detective William Hamilton, an officer present at
Goldstein's videotaped confession, "Was he drooling or anything like that?" Michael
Winerip, Oddity and Normality Vie in Subway Killer's Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1999, at BI.
130 Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails, supra note 126, at Al; see also Alan Feuer, Relieffor
Subway Victim's Family, but a Sense of Duty, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at B6.
131 David Rohde, Subway Jury Deadlocked; Mistrial Ruled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at
B1. This view is borne out by interviews with jurors in Goldstein's first trial who voted for
acquittal. Id. These jurors, a psychiatric nurse and a social worker, spoke of responsibility
in medical terms instead of legal terms and focused on criteria specific to Goldstein instead
of the broader relationship between Goldstein's crime and the community. Id. One juror
reported that the other jurors did not consider his arguments about the influence of mental
illness on the defendant's behavior because they were "bloodthirsty." Id. This juror
reported that the other jurors sought to convict Goldstein for impermissible reasons such as
"fear" and "revenge." Id.
132 Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails, supra note 125, at Al.
133 Dan Rutz & Associated Press, Involuntary Commitment Laws Controversial,
CNN.COM, May 20, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9905/20/outpatient.commitment.
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nonresponsibility of people with mental illnesses found in insanity defense
tests: following the liberal principle that criminal liability attaches to
culpable intent, a defense of insanity is available to individuals who,
because of mental illness, did not "intend" the consequences of their
actions. Nonresponsibility as used by lawmakers here, however, does not
carry the exculpatory meaning that people who are "not responsible"
because of mental disease or defect should be exempt from criminal
sanction. Rather, because the mentally ill may not be "responsible" enough
to prevent themselves from harming others, the governor argued that they
need additional deterrence to enforce law-abiding behavior. Proposing a
measure to make it a jailable offense for a person with a mental illness not
to take prescribed medication, 134 Pataki announced, "If [people with mental
illnesses] refuse to act responsibly, we must act to protect all New
Yorkers."' 135 Reinforcing personal responsibility by holding people with
mental illnesses responsible is important, he stated, to "protect us as a
,,136
society ....
These legislative activities and statements equating the imposition of
legal controls on people with mental illnesses with reinforcing norms of
individual responsibility may be seen as exercises in symbolic politics. In
the year following its enactment, Kendra's Law, which lawmakers
predicted would affect thousands of mentally ill individuals across New
York state, resulted in the commitment of one person-probably not the
definitive factor in keeping the public safe. 137 The empirical triviality of
laws like Kendra's Law, in contrast to lawmakers' inflated pronouncements
about them, puts the debate on these issues in the same category as highly
charged but practically inconsequential issues like flag burning.
134 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 1999) ("Kendra's Law"). Kendra's Law
modifies the existing outpatient commitment procedures provided for under section
9.60(a)(1). Under the law, any family member, caregiver, roommate, partner or friend may
alert the police that another person is not taking prescribed psychiatric medication; that
person may then be arrested and brought before a judge to justify the failure to take the
medication. If the judge issues an order for her/him to resume medicating, the individual
must do so or may be subjected to involuntary commitment. As enacted, incarceration is not
a penalty under this statute. Id. § 9.60; see also Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law: Kendra's Law as Case Study 65 (N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 02-04,
2002); Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to
Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2401, 2401-02 (2000).
135 Gary Spencer, Kendra's Law Gets Backing by Both Parties, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1999,
at 1.
136 Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Proposes Curb on Releases for Mentally Ill, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at Al.
137 Metro News Briefs: Courts Seldom Use Law on Drugs for Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2000, at B7 (providing enforcement statistics).
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As Sunstein notes, "[T]he debate over flag burning has everything to
do with the statement that law makes." 138 The lack of impact on whether
people with mental illnesses behave responsibly, on deterrence, or on public
safety is beside the point because "[m]any debates over the appropriate
content of law are really debates over the statement that law makes,
independent of its direct consequences."'1 39  This is particularly true of
debates and statements within the criminal law because the "criminal law is
a prime arena for the expressive function of law."
140
Jurors' decisions to convict defendants they acknowledge were legally
insane and law makers' efforts to eliminate the insanity defense and to pass
legislation specifically aimed at mentally ill individuals (whether law-
breaking or not) stand out as exercises in symbolic politics.' 4' If citizens
and their representatives feel that general norms of personal responsibility
are compromised when people exhibit the disruptive symptoms of severe
mental illnesses, then the passage of low-cost, low-impact measures, which
reemphasize the public's commitment to personal responsibility and purport
to enhance deterrence, may not be inconsistent with certain, arguably
legitimate, purposes of lawmaking. 142  Speaking in the consequentialist
idiom of harm reduction, terms such as responsibility and deterrence allow
the law tacitly to incorporate normative judgments of actors and their
preferences. 143 Thus criminal law, while appearing to honor liberal values
138 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2044-45.
139 Id. at 2051 (internal punctuation omitted).
140 Id. at 2044.
141 Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic
Politics, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 157, 161-70 (1983) (discussing the use of certain issues as
important for signaling social commitments and addressing social fears apart from any direct
impact of the measure). Stolz has argued that congressional contests over primarily
"symbolic" issues such as capital punishment create social utility through reinforcing shared
values and commitments to the maintenance of social order. Id. at 166-67. Similarly,
Seidman and Tushnet have argued that legislative action around highly-charged issues,
although most frequently expressed in deterrence terms, serves more to signal social
commitments than to achieve practical impact. Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 162-63 (1996)
(stating that the "[e]xpression of opinion about capital punishment is a way of defining
oneself and signaling to others which side one is on").
142 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413, 440
(1999) (arguing that such "symbolic" exercises can create social welfare through enhancing
the public's sense of well-being).
143 Id. at 415. Kahan suggests "that the real value" of morally neutral, consequentialist
terms (such as responsibility) "is to quiet illiberal conflict between contending cultural styles
and moral outlooks." Id.
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through overtly value-free, agreed-upon terms, 144 may give effect to shared
lay norms about various types of offenders. Judgments about people with
mental illnesses that lead to their incarceration thus go to the symbolic
value of people with mental illnesses as a vehicle for the creation of social
utility.
2. The Strong Form of the Responsibility Norm and the Defense of
"Extreme Emotional Distress "
This normative reasoning about responsibility argues that, if
responsibility itself is challenged through a finding of nonresponsibility, at
potentially high cost to the legal system and to social order, then no actor
ever should be found non-responsible for any lawbreaking act. Yet, the
application of this responsibility reasoning, both in doctrine and in practice,
shows that people with mental illnesses uniquely serve as the foil to the
notion of individual responsibility and bear disproportionately the
expressive weight of the reinforcement of the responsibility norm.
Were there a strong form of the responsibility norm, it would require
that all actors be criminally liable for their lawbreaking acts. In fact, the
law and the community at large recognize numerous forms of excuse as
legitimate to relieve or mitigate criminal responsibility. 145 The most
interesting of these, in light of the strong responsibility norm applied to
people with actual mental illnesses, is the excuse of "temporary insanity,"
also known, under the Model Penal Code ("MPC") as "extreme emotional
disturbance" or "extreme emotional distress" ("EED"). 146
144 On the importance of law's use of value-neutral concepts in a diverse society, see
generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 8-12 (1980), and
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993) (Lecture IV).
145 It is not the purpose of this paper to reprise the law and theory of excuse, and its
companion concept of justification, which have engendered their own body of scholarship.
For analyses of excuse and justification, see, for example, H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28-53 (1968) (providing and discussing
the utilitarian account of excuse); Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justification From
Excuse, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986) (discussing excuse and justification at great
length, and providing a utility-based account of excuses, particularly duress); John L. Hill, A
Utilitarian Theory ofDuress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 282-88 (1999) (same); and Sanford H.
Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 966
(1999) (defining and differentiating excuse and justification).
146 Federal law and the laws of nearly every state contain EED statutes. See 21 U.S.C. §
848(m)(7) (2000) ("The defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional
disturbance."); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2) (LexisNexis 1994 & Supp. 2001); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(2) (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1) (1997 & Supp.
2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-1201(4)(f) (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1(c)(2) (West Supp. 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2)
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Temporary insanity and EED are excuses that mitigate responsibility.
Although sometimes conflated with insanity defenses, 47 they nevertheless
are not available to people with actual mental illnesses. Rather, as Victoria
Nourse, Martha Nussbaum, and Dan Kahan, among others, have shown,
temporary insanity and EED are modem incarnations of the ancient "heat of
passion" defense. 148 These defenses provide excuses for sympathetic actors
who, despite breaking the law, may have behaved consistently with
prevailing social norms. Courts and juries historically have found
defendants "temporarily insane" where social norms concerning the
defendant's acts cause the court or jury to feel that the penalty should be
mitigated or waived-the paradigm case being that of the husband who
catches his wife in flagrante and kills her or her lover. 49  As one
commentator notes, "From the beginning there was something ironic about
the temporary insanity defense ... [because] ... every one of [the] jurors..
(LexisNexis Supp. 2002) (amended 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(2) (Supp. 2001);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(2) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2003); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(b) (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c) (Supp.
2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(2) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(f) (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3(c)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(D) (LexisNexis Supp. 2000);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(f)(2) (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 971 l(e)(2) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20
(C)(b)(2) (Supp. 2001) (amended 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-2040)(2) (Supp. 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(b) (2003 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.4(B)(ii) (LexisNexis 2000) (amended 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(ii) (2003).
147 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (2000) (misidentifying Lorena
Bobbitt's temporary insanity claim as an assertion of the insanity defense and thus conflating
temporary insanity and insanity defense standards).
148 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 307 (1996) (analyzing the heat of passion provocation defense
and its limitation to "good men") (quoting State v. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 142, 144
(1859)); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1332 (1997) (stating that lawmakers have "reject[ed] the
older talk of 'heat of passion' in favor of the more modem 'emotional distress').
149 The first temporary insanity defense in the United States arose in 1859, when a jury
acquitted Representative Daniel E. Sickles, a congressman from New York, of shooting his
wife's lover. Sickles did not deny the killing but argued his wife's infidelity had caused in
him an "insanity" to kill her lover. The jury, whether or not accepting Sickles became
"insane," concluded that Sickles' wife's lover "got what he deserved." David Margolick, At
the Bar; Madness as an Excuse: Two Similar Arguments in the Same Court, with Starkly
Different Results, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at B18 (quoting Lawrence Friedman). For a
more fulsome discussion of the case, see Robert Wright, A Normal Murder, NEW REPUBLIC,
Jul. 11, 1994, at 6.
[Vol. 96
2005] CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO MENTAL ILLNESS 253
could imagine getting pretty steamed after discovering a wife's
infidelity."'' 50  The "temporary insanity" plea thus actually serves as "a
claim of normality."''
Temporary insanity applied primarily to lethal husbands until the
middle of the twentieth century. 152 As an Oklahoma court commented in
acquitting a husband for killing his wife's lover:
[A] man of good moral character such as that possessed by the defendant, highly
respected in his community, having regard for his duties as a husband and the virtue
of women, upon learning of the immorality of his wife, might be shocked, or such
knowledge might prey upon his mind and cause temporary insanity. In fact it would
appear that such would be the most likely consequence of obtaining such
information.1
53
Here, the court expressly links good social performance with qualification
for "temporary insanity" mitigation: the court asserts that the more a person
conforms with valued social norms, the more likely he is to qualify as
"temporarily insane" when breaking the law to protect valued social norms.
Early American and English law, drawing implicitly upon a traditional
"code of honor,"' 5 4 defined a set of situations socially acknowledged to
constitute sufficient provocation for an honorable man to kill.'55 (H.L.A.
Hart, for example, expressly relied on "human nature" for his conclusions
about what justifiably could provoke a man to kill, concluding that men are
"capable of self-control when confronted with an open till but not when
confronted with a wife in adultery."' 156) Temporary insanity also has come
'50 Wright, supra note 152, at 6.
151 Id.
152 Another area in which temporary insanity often applies is infanticide, a crime that
may provoke significant empathy. Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms
with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 13 (1996) (citing George K.
Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical Opinion in Mid- Victorian England,
34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 403, 413 (1979)). French infanticide law of the eighteen
hundreds similarly recognized "folie passagere"--literally, temporary insanity-as a
complete defense to infanticide, which at that time carried a capital penalty. James M.
Donovan, Infanticide and the Juries in France, 1825-1913, 16 J. FAM. HiST. 157, 169
(1991).
'53 Hamilton v. State, 244 P.2d 328, 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
154 Nourse, supra note 151, at 1340-41.
155 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
413 (6th ed. 1995) ("The long-standing common law rule ...permits the jury to find
adequate provocation mostly in a few narrowly defined circumstances."). The
circumstances, known as the "nineteenth century four," included adultery, violent assault,
mutual combat, and false arrest. Id. Conversely, "mere words" and other "trivial"
provocation were excluded. Id.
156 HART, supra note 145, at 33. Hart's consideration of the nature of adequate
provocation was restricted to men, and, presumably, to heterosexual men. Id.
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to excuse illegal conduct arising under newly-sympathetic fact patterns such
as killings or batteries by female victims of domestic violence. 157 While
this marks a cultural transformation, the nature of the defense remains the
same: it provides an excuse to those who behave consistently with
community norms, although the underlying norms may change over time.
Like temporary insanity, EED was born in the bedroom.158 While the
MPC's EED defense does not recognize specific situations as de jure
sufficient to provoke the reasonable person, it does apply to specific people
under limited circumstances: it evaluates the sufficiency of the provocation
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same position as the
defendant. 59 The drafters articulated their intent that the EED defenses
apply to the "ordinary" and "reasonable" person who finds him/herself
affected by a "provocative circumstance" that he or she did not create.
160
By its plain language, this defense does not apply to people who suffer an
"emotional disturbance" preceding or separate from the "provocative
circumstance" but is available to "ordinary" people who find themselves the
victim of circumstances. Temporary insanity and EED share the central
notion that "ordinary," "reasonable," non-mentally ill defendants are less
culpable when they lose "self-control" 61 -but only for "the right
reasons."'
162
157 For a discussion of the relationship between temporary insanity claims and domestic
violence, see, for example, ANNE JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 299-309 (1980) (discussing the
landmark Francine Hughes case, the first case in which domestic violence was raised as a
defense); Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a
Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 229, 292-94 (1996); Anne
M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 55 n.275 (2000).
158 Nourse, supra note 148, at 1332 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 commentary at
47-48 (Tentative Draft 1959)) ("[Lawmakers have] reject[ed] the older talk of 'heat of
passion' in favor of the more modem 'emotional distress."').
159 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Ten states have adopted
the subjective MPC standard to determine adequacy of provocation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1103 (1984); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-1504 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a,
53a-55 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 632 (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. §
707-702 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507.020-030 (West 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:2 (1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.20(2), 125.25 (1)(a) (McKinney 1980); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-02 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (1983).
160 See supra note 158. The comment reads, "[t]hat the provocative circumstance must
be sufficient to deprive a reasonable or an ordinary man of self-control, leaves much to be
desired since it totally excludes any attention to the special situation of the actor....
Formulation in the draft affords sufficient flexibility to differentiate between those
special factors in the actor's situation which should be deemed material... and those
which properly should be ignored." Id. at 1340.
161 id.
162 Analyzing heat of passion provocation requirements, Kahan and Nussbaum point to
the common law's limitation of this defense to the upright and sound actor, by
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The core of these excuses, then, lies not in excusing loss of control but
in granting limited permission to violate the law in the service of protecting
core social values, in specific instances where lawful conduct and
virtuousness conflict.1 63 Were there a "strong" form of the responsibility
norm, temporary insanity and EED defenses would not mitigate the
punishment of individuals who break the law, and even kill, in the face of a
"provocative circumstance." Yet, even nonviolent and non-offending
people with mental illnesses are incarcerated in the name of enforcing
"responsibility." This undercuts the notion that a strong form of the
responsibility norm is responsible for the incarceration of any and all
lawbreakers separate from their intent, but points rather to the over-
detention specifically of people with mental illnesses in the name of
"responsibility."
3. Hospital-Based Commitment as an Unacceptable Alternative Sanction
As shown above, scholars, lawmakers, and community members
directly express the view that mental illness is a failing of the person with
the disease and that the punishment of people with mental illnesses serves
to support popular norms of responsibility. The view that mental illnesses
are conceived of under a moral/punitive model, not a medical/therapeutic
model, further is evidenced by the rejection of civil confinement of people
with mental illnesses as a potential "alternative sanction."
Neither hospital-based confinement as a potential alternative to jailing
non-charged and/or nonviolent mentally ill adults and children nor
commitment resulting from an insanity acquittal have been considered
previously in the extensive literature on alternative sanctions. Civil
commitment diverges from other alternative sanctions in that it is a civil
disposition resulting in confinement, while other alternative sanctions are
criminal penalties that may or may not result in confinement. Yet, civil
commitment shares features with conventional alternative sanctions. Its
identity as a civil disposition makes it similar to the alternative criminal
sanction of fines, which are prevalent in the civil context, while the
imposition of potentially therapeutic hospital-based supervision makes it
similar to other potentially rehabilitative sanctions like community service.
"insisting... [that] killings... proceed [not] from a bad or corrupt heart, [but] rather from
the infirmity of passion to which even good men are subject." Kahan & Nussbaum, supra
note 148, at 307 (quoting State v. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 142, 144 (1859)) (internal
quotations omitted); see also id. at 313-19 (arguing generally that the law excuses where the
defendant loses control for the "right reasons" but punishes more severely if he or she




Further, the possibility of out-patient "commitment," where the mentally ill
individual receives mandatory treatment while living at home or in an open
facility, shares features with the alternative sanctions of home confinement
or of mandatory treatment at a substance abuse center.
Following a classical consequentialist analysis, under which deterrence
and incapacitation should be able to justify any given confinement regime,
the civil confinement of people with mental illnesses should be preferable
to incarceration. If the deterrent harm imposed by incarceration is the loss
of liberty itself, then the loss of liberty imposed by indefinite civil
commitment should deter as well as or better than a fixed term of
incarceration. Civil commitment may visit a greater deprivation of liberty
upon its object than criminal confinement. First, it confines more: the
length of civil commitment is indefinite and, on average, lasts longer than a
criminal sentence for the same offense. 164  Second, it visits a greater
invasion of autonomy on the inmate than prison: psychiatric hospitals may
impose on inmates an array of restraint and disciplinary tools prohibited in
prisons. 165 Moreover, empirical studies demonstrate that commitment is a
less appealing alternative to charged mentally ill offenders than
incarceration. 
66
With the longer average deprivation of liberty and potentially greater
invasion of autonomy, commitment should incapacitate and deter as well or
better than incarceration. Commitment also may produce utility more
broadly through realizing an improved outcome for the mentally ill
individual, allowing him or her to return to productivity. If deterrence and
incapacitation were the chief concerns addressed by incarcerating mentally
ill offenders, the criminal system should abundantly employ hospital-based
confinement, as it imposes a greater objective and perceived disutility on
the offender and enhances public safety, all at lower cost.
Because incarceration produces lower social utility than commitment
when analyzed within the consequentialist framework, any preference for
imprisonment points to the superior power of imprisonment over
therapeutic alternatives to meet criminal law goals that relate to satisfying
public tastes. That is, civil commitment fails similarly to other,
conventional alternative sanctions because it fails to signal condemnation
and fails to signal unequivocal support for the norm that is reinforced by the
164 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
165 A hospital may, in a fitting case and under limited circumstances, administer electric
shocks, psychotropic medication, or total bodily restraint.
166 CORR. Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 11 (noting that "some defendants with serious
mental illness refuse to permit their defense attorneys to interpose a NGRI defense...
because they prefer incarceration to long-term hospitalization").
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punishment of the population that is the target of the alternative sanction.
This is because "[c]riminal law produces utility not just by deterring crime
but also by constructing valued social meanings. Forms of affliction that
may be equivalent for deterrence purposes may be radically disparate in
their expressive value."' 
67
Alternative sanctions are least likely to displace incarceration where
the alternative carries a positive association instead of a punitive one.
1 68
The expectation that punishments should condemn, whether or not they
deter and incapacitate, makes the acceptability of a sanction turn on the
community's evaluation of whether the social meaning of the sanction and
of the actor or offense match. Experience with alternative sanctions
demonstrates that, to gain public and legislative acceptance, a criminal
sanction must unequivocally go beyond protecting the public to expressing
condemnation of the actor. 169 A sanction such as civil commitment that
does not express the condemnation distinctively associated with
imprisonment, even if superior in cost-efficiently achieving deterrence and
public safety, fails to achieve public buy-in. 170  Thus, when considered
under the moral/punitive model of mental illness, the notion that large-scale
shifts of people with mental illnesses from punitive to medical confinement
could better achieve deterrence and incapacitation seems perverse, and the
preference for confinement, despite the lack of consequentialist justification
for it, seems rational.
IV. ENFORCING ORDER AND PUNISHING DEVIANCE THROUGH
INCARCERATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES
The fact of punitive confinement, more than any other, embodies the
history of the treatment of people with mental illnesses.17 1 While punitive
confinement and therapeutic confinement both place people with mental
illnesses apart from the general community, punitive confinement does so
out of concern not for people with such illnesses but for other community
members. This distinction marks out the difference between the therapeutic
or medical model and the punitive model-that is, whether people are
167 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 617
(1996).
168 Id. at 625.
169 id.
170 Id.
171 This assertion reprises, generally, the argument advanced by Michel Foucault.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF




separated from the general community for their own benefit, or whether
they are separated for the greater comfort of those who prefer not to have
such people among them. Pervasive punitive confinement and the
unacceptability of treatment-based alternatives points towards the
connection between the social meanings of mental illness and incarceration,
and, accordingly the role that the incarceration of people with mental
illnesses plays in creating certain social meanings and reinforcing certain
social norms.
The history of the punitive confinement of people with mental
illnesses has been addressed by scholars working in cultural history and in
the history of science and medicine. 172 This Part does not attempt to restate
this extensive body of scholarship but draws upon it to illustrate that the
primary method of dealing with people with mental illnesses throughout
Western history has been punitive confinement. This history serves to
support this Article's claim that a moral/punitive model of mental illness is
in fact dominant in the culture and the related claim that attempts to relocate
people with mental illnesses from punitive confinement to therapeutic
alternatives must contend with this conception before it will be possible to
create meaningful change.
Like mental illness, confinement to a prison, too, carries social
meaning. Although the criminal system imposes incarceration for almost
every offense, 173 incarceration is not a necessary form of incapacitation or
affliction. A sanction need only signal in a generally-understood way the
community's condemnation; any reliable form of incapacitation could
promote public safety and a universe of afflictions could promote general
and specific deterrence. 74  Rather, forms of punishment are culturally
contingent. 175  Prison alone, a substantial body of scholarship argues,
uniquely symbolize collective disgust, serving as the place for, and as
172 Among numerous excellent works, see, for example, id.; GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD
AMONG Us: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA'S MENTALLY ILL (1994); Roy PORTER,
MADMEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADMEN, MAD DOCTORS, AND LUNATICS (2004); DANIEL N.
ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMORS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE
PRESENT (1996).
173 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS:
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS 2000 tbl.2 (2003) (68% of felons sentenced to
incarceration).
174 A wrongdoer committing the same act in different times or places could be subject
variously to the stocks, imprisonment, whipping, hanging, or the guillotine, among other
punishments. See generally THE OxFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF
PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995)




2005] CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO MENTAL ILLNESS 259
metaphor of, the disposal of society's "filth."' 176 Disgust relates to norm
reinforcement: while "fear [is a] react[ion] to transgressions against one's
own person, disgust takes aim at ... the threat that open deviance poses to
the status of those who faithfully abide by dominant norms.' 77
Incarceration---confinement to the place of disgust-shows the
community's disgust for the offender in response to his or her deviance.
Where the offense of conviction is nonviolent, and there may be little to
fear from the offender, confining an offender to prison may satisfy
collective disgust and honor norms of responsibility and order more than
accomplishing any consequentialist purpose for imprisonment.
The first permanent places for the confinement of the severely
mentally ill, originating in the early Renaissance, were distinctly punitive in
character as well as evocative of moral stigma. Towns and villages began
to ship their mentally ill to leprosariums left empty by the subsidence of
leprosy. Although sending people with mental illnesses to leprosariums
may seem akin to sending them to hospitals, the meaning of the leprosarium
was unambiguously condemnatory. The Church and community
understood leprosy as a mark of sin, requiring sufferers' expulsion from the
community; thus, leprosariums were conceived of in moral, not health-
related, terms. 178 Converted leprosariums gained symbolic value during the
Renaissance and early Enlightenment as places for the correction of the
morally blameful as they developed into actual houses of correction, the
precursors of prisons. In these places, the mentally ill and others confined
for social deviance ranging from profligacy to drunkenness received
corporal punishment and participated in forced work regimes. These
houses of confinement for the "immoral" are the direct ancestors of the
prison and the insane asylum, but not of the medical hospital. In the Royal
Edict of 1665, Louis XIII established "h6piteaux" for the confinement of
176 MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE
UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 146 (1996). See also generally, e.g.,
ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 12-13 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1st ed.
Pantheon 1977) (discussing the ability of forms of penal affliction to convey social
relationships); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND
ITS CRITICS 1 (W. Cragg ed., 1992); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 111 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988); Kahan, Social Meaning,
supra note 13, at 616 ("Imprisonment unmistakably expresses moral indignation because of
the sacred place of liberty in our culture.").
177 Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621,
1637 (1998) (reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997)).
178 Accordingly, the Church forbade lepers from taking Holy Communion, including in
churches serving only leper colonies. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note
171, at 38.
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the mad and disorderly, the indigent, debtors, vagrant or abandoned
children, prostitutes and other sexually transgressive women, and a melange
of other deviants. 1
79
Although these institutions were some of the first to bear the name
"hospital," "the H6pital G;nral [was] not a medical establishment ...
[and] had nothing to do with any medical concept."' 80  The edict
establishing the h6piteaux makes their punitive nature clear through
authorizing the director to institute disciplinary regimes to correct the
inmates, including the use of "stakes, irons, prisons, and dungeons ... so
much as [directors] deem necessary .... ,,18' Directors of the h6piteaux
came from the ranks of law enforcement and included such figures as the
Chief of Police.I2
In England and Germany in the fifteen and sixteen hundreds, similar
acts authorized the creation of "houses of correction" and of Zuchthdusern,
respectively, for the confinement of deviants including the mentally ill,
disorderly, sexually wayward, and indigent.' 83  Zuchthaus translates as
house of correction and is in contemporary parlance a word for
"penitentiary."' 8 4 But the sense conveyed by zucht- is more far-ranging and
actually implies the relationship specifically between mental disorder and
179 Id. at 40. The Edict of 1676 nationalized the regime, requiring each city to establish
and maintain a h6pital. Id. at 41 (citing Edict of June 16, 1676). Institutions established by
the first edict include the H6pital Ginhral, La Salp~trire, and Bictre. Id. At about the
same time, the Diocese of Paris established Sainte-Lazare and a collection of other
confinement houses out of its "lazar" or leper houses, perpetuating the identification between
people with mental illnesses and lepers. Id. at 42. Readers may recognize La Salpetrire
and Bic~tre as the institutions where Philippe Pinel and Frangois Charcot would identify the
phenomenon of hysteria and where Sigmund Freud developed many of his theories of
neurotic illness. Despite their place in the history of psychiatry, it is unlikely that
contemporaries of these institutions would have identified them being specifically "mental"
asylums instead of penal institutions. As Alan Gauld describes it, the "Salp~triire was an
immense complex... almost a town in its own right... inhabited by... a total 5000
persons" including "the destitute," "the senile," "prostitutes," and "the insane." ALAN
GAULD, A HISTORY OF HYPNOTISM 306 (1992). Through the 1800s, a significant purpose of
these institutions was the confinement of prostitutes and other female "degenerates," defined
as those who departed from societal expectations about female sexual conduct. THOMAS
LACQUER, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 241-43 (1992).
180 FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 171, at 40. About 10% of the
residents of the Hdpital Gdnral in Paris consisted of "the insane," "individuals of
wandering mind," and the "completely mad." Id. at 65.
181 Id. (citing the Edict of 1676, Art. XII).
182 Id. at 41.
183 Id. at 43.
184 THE NEW CASSELL'S GERMAN DICTIONARY 589 (Harold T. Betteridge ed., 1958).
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punitive confinement: 185 Zucht implies the sense of the way things should
be, the natural order.' 86 That which is unzucht violates the social order:
unzucht carries the meaning of that which transgresses against social
norms. 187 Thus that which violates the order of things (die unzucht) is that
which penal confinement (Zuchthausstrafe) restores. That people with
mental illnesses were the first to be confined in Zuchthdusern suggests that
they are the basic deviants, the essential subject for re-ordering. In the
creation of the Zuchthaus for people with mental illnesses, and the
construction of people with mental illnesses as die unzucht, we see the basic
expression, at a linguistic and historical level, of the social meaning of
mental illness as a public order problem requiring punitive correction for
the reestablishment of valued social norms.
Similarly, throughout the seventeen and eighteen hundreds in Europe
and the United States, the incarceration of people with mental illnesses for
general deviance was a constant feature. John Howard, an early mental
health reformer, who at the end of the eighteenth century surveyed centers
of confinement ("workhouses, prisons") in England, Germany, France,
Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands found the mad, and the indigent, and the
convicted confined together without distinction. 188  These confinement
centers, Howard's study showed, existed to reinforce social order through
"eject[ing] ... all forms of social uselessness.' 89
In parallel to this history of mental illness as a public order problem
addressed through confinement, certain Enlightenment medical
practitioners began to advance a competing model for understanding mental
illnesses as afflictions equivalent to other physical illnesses. Interestingly,
this medical/therapeutic conception developed in explicit contrast to the
185 Despite evolving in the eighteen hundreds into the term for penitentiary, Zuchthaus
retained through the middle of the twentieth century the connotation of a place for confining
the mentally ill. Interview with Dr. Alexander Karp, Researcher, Freud Inst., in Frankfurt,
F.R.G. (Apr. 10, 2001). During the Third Reich, the National Socialist party frequently
found those who opposed the Party, and thus who deviated from the social order, to be
"mentally ill" (verrilckt; geisteskrank)-instead of criminal (Verbrecher)-and confined
them in Zuchthiusern for "re-ordering." Id. The Zuchthdusern of the Third Reich carried
almost exclusively the connotation of "mental institution." Id. Following World War 1I, the
term has fallen out of use as a word to describe a prison or jail. Id.
186 Die zucht can mean a breed, an order, culture, or discipline. THE NEW CASSELL'S
GERMAN DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 589. Aufzucht means well-bred, while selbstzucht
implies self-generated conformity with that which should be. Id. at 42, 426.
187 Id. at 507. A contemporary legal meaning of the term is also "sex crime." Id.
188 FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 171, at 44-45.
189 Id. at 58.
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moral conception and penal treatment of people with mental illnesses.190
For example, Dr. William Battie, an English physician, expressed in 1758
the emergent medical view of mental illness as being akin to "other
distempers, which are equally dreadful and obstinate, ... and such unhappy
objects ought by no means to be... shut in loathsome prisons as criminals.
.. ,,191 These practitioners for the first time decried the confinement of the
mentally ill in houses of correction and began to develop specialized, quasi-
medical facilities for people with mental illnesses-"asylums."
' 192
But even in asylums, the medical/therapeutic conception did not
unambiguously triumph over the moral/punitive conception, as these
institutions continued to represent a conception of mental illness as being at
least as much a moral problem as a medical one. Most strikingly attesting
to this ambivalence, the Association of Medical Superintendents of
American Institutions for the Insane, an organization founded in 1844 by
the superintendents of several asylums, did not include any doctors or
others with medical training.' 93 Rather, asylum superintendents consisted
of men with religious and philanthropic backgrounds who instituted
"treatment" regimes on a disciplinary model.
1 94
Chronicling the disciplinary nature (and lack of professionalism) of
these putatively therapeutic establishments, Dr. Edward Charles Spitzka, an
early campaigner for the medicalization of the treatment of people with
mental illnesses, inventoried the conditions at one New York asylum,
finding that "during the current year... [t]hree patients beaten to death, one
of whom has twelve ribs broken! One patient boiled to death, .. .and
several patients drowned ... 195 The institutional history of mental illness
is remarkably complex and various but a constant is that mental illness
itself, apart from any independent criminal act, has brought and continues to
bring mentally ill actors within punitive confinement. Because
incarceration is the primary symbol of separateness from the community,
the mentally ill individual, who is by definition deviant in some way,
becomes a "proper" subject of imprisonment.
190 GROB, supra note 172, at 25-53 (charting the rise of medicalized understandings of
mental illness in England, France, and the United States, and the concomitant development
of treatment-oriented institutions specifically for the mentally ill).
191 WILLIAM BATTIE, A TREATISE ON MADNESS (1758), quoted in GROB, supra note 172,
at 25.
192 GROB, supra note 172, at 24.
193 CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW IN THE GILDED AGE 60-62 (1968). In fact, the Association specifically refused to allow
neurologists to join the Association or care for inmates. Id.
194 Id.
9 Id. at 73.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
To summarize: There is a dominant conception of mental illness as
reflecting a defect of morality or will. People with mental illnesses are
seen, not uniformly but predominantly, as expressing a culpable failure to
conform one's behavior to social norms. The association of mental illness
with social irresponsibility makes it expressively rational to reinforce the
responsibility norm by punishing people with such illnesses. Most of these
exercises in punitive confinement and symbolic lawmaking actually have
minimal impact on deterrence and public safety. The emphasis on the
symbolism of punishment, through criminal confinement, over its actual
effect is shown by the unacceptability of civil confinement as an alternative
sanction. Separately, there may be a preference for punishing people with
mental illnesses, as shown through the existence of established excuse
categories for law-breaking actors who do not suffer from mental illnesses
(e.g., "temporary insanity").
Under the currently prevailing social meaning ascribed to people with
mental illnesses, their punishment may create social utility through the
reinforcement of the responsibility norm. In this fashion, the essential norm
of individual responsibility can be reinforced effectively through exercises
in symbolic politics affecting a relatively small and voiceless minority.
Relatedly, as long as the social meanings associated with mental illness
arise under the moral/punitive paradigm instead of the medical/therapeutic
paradigm, evaluative judgment will locate mentally ill actors in penal,
rather than medical, confinement.
Expressive theory argues that effective reforms to the criminal system
must pay attention to the social meanings of criminalized behaviors and
penal affliction. Bringing about change is as much a matter of changing
social meanings as of changing doctrine; the only doctrinal changes that
will be effective are those that are sensitive to social meanings and that
present their proposals in ways that are consonant with the normative
judgments of the community. In this case, it is not merely the meaning of
forms of punishment that must be considered, as with the implementation of
alternative sanctions for other categories of offenders, but, importantly, the
cultural meanings of mental illness and of the intersection of mental illness
with confinement.
This Article opened with the question: Why do we primarily deal with
mentally ill people through the criminal justice system when incarceration
is an economically inefficient and morally problematic way to address
mental illness? Why do we, as a society, pay a minimum of $6 billion per
year to criminally confine nonviolent or non-offending adults and children
with mental illnesses? The short answer is that we want them there.
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If we believe that social institutions match and reinforce social
meanings, then it is the intersection of the cultural perception of the
mentally ill as culpably deviating from valued norms, and of the criminal
system as appropriate to norms of responsibility and of order generally,
that, logically, leads to the localization of the mentally ill in the criminal
system. Every criminal law rationale and doctrine relating to the mentally
ill traced within this Article substantiates this contention: deterrence
arguments with no rational relationship to deterrence ends; incapacitation
arguments that favor the less effective form of incapacitation; responsibility
tests that do not ascertain individual responsibility; economic rationales for
grossly wasteful resource allocations; and the doctrine of the insanity
defense that purports to divert the mentally ill but that funnels them into
criminal confinement.
Using expressive theory to examine why the paradoxes above not only
are acceptable but largely unexamined, this Article makes several claims
about how the criminal system works relative to the mentally ill: The
criminal system is the primary institution that deals with people with mental
illnesses in the United States, at a cost of billions of dollars per year. The
use of the criminal system instead of, for example, public health or private
medical alternatives, is not rationally related to public safety or deterrence.
Insofar as decision-makers such as jurors or lawmakers do evaluate mental
illness, that evaluation is a judgment upon the general relationship between
mental illness and "responsibility," not an evaluation of any causative effect
of illness on a specific individual's acts. Viewing people with mental
illnesses as violators against norms of responsibility and social order-as
unzucht--our culture identifies the mentally ill as appropriate subjects of
reordering through punitive confinement (location in Zuchthdusern). A
"strong form" of the responsibility norm is not the cause of the over-
incarceration of people with mental illnesses, as shown by the existence of
excuse categories that mitigate culpability but that, by their plain language,
to not apply to people with mental illnesses. The instrumental use of people
with mental illnesses as symbols for the reinforcement of social
commitments to personal responsibility may create social utility, but at
what should be an unacceptable financial and human cost.
Bringing about change in the treatment and disposition of people with
mental illnesses is as much a matter of changing social meanings as of
changing doctrine. The proposals that will be most effective in overcoming
resistance will be those that are attentive to social meanings and that are
expressed in ways consonant with evaluative judgments of the community.
Access to and funding for treatment, probably the greatest practical factor
relating to whether a person with a mental illness wind up in the criminal
system, also depends upon altering social meaning. States' preferential
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funding of mental health services in prisons instead of hospitals represents a
set of political choices and commitments. These funding choices respond
to the preferences of popular constituencies and are no less expressive of
dominant social attitudes toward people with mental illnesses than specific
legal statements by lawmakers.
Of course, legal signaling and social meaning engage dialectically;
reform efforts could target legal doctrines and institutions, the language of
the law, or social meanings of mental illness themselves. Second-
generation law and economics offers some techniques for the ambiguation
of social meanings and the ways in which legal actors can act as "meaning
architects., 196 These tools should be employed by reformers who seek to
substitute a public health response for the current public order response to
issues of mental illness.
Until there is a shift in the way that the general culture thinks about
mental illness, a transition from the moral/punitive conception of such
illnesses to a medical/therapeutic model, people with mental illnesses will
remain shut up in actual prisons and in the prison of treatable, but
undertreated, disease. These are the prisons of the mind: People with
mental illnesses are trapped in our thoughts about them. To get the
mentally ill out of prison, we need to think them out first. To do so, we
must first think our way out of conventional discourses that reinforce
historic understandings of the intersection of mental illness and punishment.
J96 Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 10, at 1008.
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